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ABSTRACT 
As action-oriented organizations, fire departments have traditionally played a 
reactive role in public safety, responding to emergencies in progress to protect the lives, 
and property of their citizens.  The problem is that the world has changed.  Increasing 
terrorist threats against our homeland and the potential for pandemic or other natural 
disasters are shifting the mission and placing new unconventional demands on the fire 
department.  Meeting these challenges will require strategies to identify and address the 
future role of the fire service in homeland security.   
This thesis used the Delphi method to explore what this future role might be.  
Information, responses, and recommendations from three groups of SMEs were 
examined, analyzed, and synthesized to determine key issues the fire service will face. 
The future role of the fire service in homeland security will demand the need for 
progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence engagement, and the adoption 
of a shifting mission that supports preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery of 
terrorist attacks. Emerging issues and areas of responsibility to meet new asymmetrical 
threats require a response paradigm. This response paradigm in the fire department 
should include the ability to adjust service delivery to meet all hazard and homeland 
security demands.    
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
As action-oriented organizations, fire departments have traditionally played a 
reactive role in public safety, responding to emergencies in progress to protect the lives 
and property of its citizens.  The industry has enjoyed a long, successful history of 
excellent emergency incident management. Usually the first to arrive on the scene, 
firefighters take pride in how quickly tactical operations can be deployed to mitigate 
emergencies.  
The problem is that the world has changed.  Tactical, short-term goals work very 
well when dealing with ordinary emergencies, but when dealing with the complex and 
dynamic threats of terrorism or large-scale disasters, they are woefully inadequate.  For 
instance, fire departments employing traditional planning methods for emergency 
response and recovery were taken by surprise and quickly overwhelmed by the horrific 
acts and subsequent deaths of thousands of victims, including 350 first responders, on 
September 11, 2001.  
Increasing threats against our homeland and the potential for pandemics or other 
natural disasters are shifting the mission and placing new, unconventional demands on 
the fire department.  From this shift to homeland security and disaster preparedness 
emerges the realization that firefighters will not be successful employing traditional or 
tactical solutions to these complex incidents.   Meeting these challenges will require 
strategic planning, prevention, and collaboration with other fire departments and first 
responders as well as members of the community.  This realization is likely to be a 
cultural shock to the reactive, quick response quick solution — status quo — vision of 
firefighting.  However, complex emergent issues demand well-thought-out collaborative 
planning. 
Furthermore, homeland security experts believe the probability for future terrorist 




strategic plans to meet these demands.  Accordingly, fire service leaders should be 
developing long-range goals and policies designed to plug current and future gaps in 
service delivery.  
Additionally, much consideration should be given to the ability of fire service 
leaders to effectively manage the changing mission as well as the ability to forecast the 
future role of firefighters in homeland security.  A basic framework to determine the 
future role of fire service in homeland security should include strategies to address the 
four goals defined in the revised National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS).  The 
goals of the NSHS include prevention, protection, response, recovery; and the aspiration 
to continue to strengthen the foundation of homeland security in order to ensure long-
term success.  
In order to achieve these goals, the fire service will need to shift from traditional 
status quo service delivery and expand its future role in national strategies for homeland 
security.   These changes will have the greatest opportunity to succeed if the fire service 
establishes its place in homeland security planning and develops a strategy to address 
leadership and collaboration challenges. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What changes might the fire service make in order to develop a long-term 
strategic plan to enhance and support critical missions defined in the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security in the next five to ten years? 
• How might leaders in the fire service anticipate and plan for strategic 
changes in order to support the prevention and protection of — and the 
response and recovery from — future terrorist acts? 
• What strategy could fire service leaders develop to manage leadership and 
organizational challenges to future homeland security needs?  
• How could the role of the fire service be expanded to support future 
homeland security issues in a changing threat environment? 
• What actions would the fire industry need to take to build long lasting 
integrated, interdependent collaborative relationships with other homeland 
security agencies? 
• What are the emerging issues that could be shaping future fire service 
homeland security efforts? 
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C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the terrorist attacks, an abundance of information on homeland security has 
been created around the National Strategy for Homeland Security and the goals of 
prevention, protection, response, and recovery (Bellavita, 2005). Several theses have 
been written suggesting the need for strategic and mission changes in the fire service 
(Doherty, 2004; Flowers, 2006; & Welch, 2006).  However, the author was unable to find 
literature providing information specific to what the fire service should be doing to 
address future homeland security issues.  There are some books that predate the 9/11 
attacks which address leadership challenges in the fire service, but they tend to focus on 
emergency incident management and short-term goals.  
On the other hand, perhaps the attempt to separate and distinguish firefighters 
from the other first responder community members when looking at the future role of fire 
services could prove to be part of the problem.  With the exception of specific operational 
concerns, emergency response organizations share similar homeland security issues.  
These issues include concerns about funding, threats, hazards, borders, interoperability, 
intelligence, response, transportation, equipment, and pandemics (Bellavita, 2006). 
Additionally, they each face a lack of mission clarity and cultural challenges, and they 
each require resources, sustained capabilities, guidance, and leadership (Walker, 2001).  
As such, the skills needed to lead and plan for future expectations are no different from 
those required of other first responders, the GAO, the Coast Guard, corporate America, or 
any other discipline.   
Consequently, literature on emerging homeland security issues, emergency 
management, intelligence collection, and national strategies and policies can provide 
insight and are applicable to the fire service.  Since 9/11, a number of theses have been 
generated focusing directly or indirectly on the need for strategic and adaptive change.  
Relevant aspects of these perspectives will be evaluated and synthesized into this 
literature review.  In addition to these, there is an abundance of literature that is universal 
to all disciplines on leadership, strategy, capability, cultural challenges, team building 
and change management. 
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1. Leadership Challenges 
a. Leadership 
Carter and Rausch’s book, Management in the Fire Service, is a basic 
management book tailored to the specific functions of the fire service.  Although the 
book focused heavily on incident response and mitigation, there is an entire chapter 
dedicated to fire department service beyond firefighting.  However, most of that chapter 
dealt with emergency management and mitigation of non-fire emergencies such as 
emergency medical services, confined space, and hazardous material.  The author did 
address the importance of building relationships with local, state and federal first 
responders in order to better mitigate a major disaster.  Some of this information could be 
used in establishing specific partnerships with members of the community.  Carter and 
Rausch also addressed labor relations, civil rights, and diversity (1999). The book failed 
to mention growing pains or issues associated with an adaptive environment.  Since the 
book was published in 1999, there is hardly any mention of threats of terrorism.   
In their book Leadership on the Line, Harvard University Professors 
Ronald A. Heifetz and Marty Linsky discussed why leadership is so dangerous, how 
people fail at it, and how some leaders contribute to their own demise when orchestrating 
change.  Authorities resolved technical challenges by applying current expertise.  An 
adaptive leader will coach the people with the problem to resolve the issue.  Linsky is 
very passionate in his belief that when people expect the authority to resolve adaptive 
problems they end up with dysfunctional leader ship (Heifetz & Linsky 2002). 
This line of thinking is exhibited by the behavior and characteristics of 
managers in the fire industry.   There is a prominent problem on the company officer and 
mid-management level.  Some leaders in the fire service believe this dysfunction exists 
because the hierarchical structure of the organization causes most decisions to be made 
by upper management.   
A study completed by Fire 20/20, a research and education nonprofit 
organization dedicated to uniting fire and Emergency Medical Services (EMS) 
stakeholders to recruit and retain a qualified, inclusive, competent fire and EMS 
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workforce by the year 2020,  reported that members of the fire department exhibit a 
number of dysfunctional behaviors that are present throughout the fire service including 
supervisory neglect, indifference, inappropriate work place behavior, lack of policies and 
procedures, failure to enforce existing policies, nepotism, etc.  These dysfunctional traits 
are perpetuated by managers and supervisors throughout the industry (FIRE 20/20, 2007, 
p. 24).  
Similarly, Denise F. Williams, a Colonel in the United States Army, 
described leaders who take part in destructive behaviors and cause harm to the 
organization as “toxic leaders.”  The Williams report went on to identify the 
characteristics, behaviors, and types of toxic leaders, which she reports are prevalent 
throughout the U.S. Army (2005).  
b. Strategy 
According to Dr. Christopher Bellavita, a professor at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), managers focus on what is, while leaders look forward to 
what should be (2006, p.2). For purposes of this paper, strategy will refer to a carefully 
devised plan of action to identify and achieve long and short-term goals in order to 
sustain the nation’s homeland security efforts (Walker, 2001). The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security defined strategy as an effort to mobilize and organize the nation to 
secure the United States homeland from terrorist attacks (Office of Homeland Security 
[OHS], 2002). Carter and Rausch’s references to strategy apply to short-term emergency 
incidents attack approaches (1999). 
Bellavita pointed out that those who are interested in the future have an 
obligation to know something about the past (2006).   Homeland security’s past includes 
lessons learned and the strategies, policies, programs, and processes that are currently 
shaping efforts to protect America.  Therefore, initiatives to formulate a plan of action for 
securing the homeland in the future should start with a review of the literature identifying 
related goals and objectives already in place, such as the National Preparedness System.   
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Six basic documents comprise the National Preparedness System.  They 
are the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), the National Planning Scenarios (NPS), the 
Universal Task List (UTL), the Target Capabilities List (TCL), the National Response 
Plan (NRP), and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) (Clovis, 2006). 
Literature within these documents defined goals, objectives, and critical missions that can 
be used to explore the future role of the Fire Department.  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD), the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), 
which has been revised and will be discussed later; and HSPD-5, offer a broader 
framework for homeland security.  In fact, most of these documents are too broad and 
unspecific.  Some provided perimeters that could limit an organization’s role in homeland 
security by marginalizing them to specific functions; such is the case with firefighters 
being limited to response and recovery.  In this case, the fire service was not included in 
the prevention pillar of the NSHL. None of the strategies provided guidance on adaptive 
and/or cultural changes, though they are all essential to establishing the foundation of this 
thesis.   
c. Expanding Role of Firefighters 
The need to expand and enhance the role of firefighters in prevention and 
mitigation of emergencies has not only been demonstrated by past large-scale disasters 
but is supported by the National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS).  The NSHS 
requested mobilization and organization of Americans to create a culture of preparedness 
to fight terrorism (Office of the President, 2007).  In his letter to Americans in which he 
introduced the NSHS, President Bush explained that homeland security must be a shared 
responsibility of the entire nation.  Aspects of the NSHS could serve as a guide for fire 
service leaders to develop a framework designed to expand the role of firefighters to 
prevent terrorist attacks and both natural and man-made disasters (Office of the President, 
2007). Conversely, a comprehensive review of this document revealed the exclusion of 
the fire department in five of the six critical missions.   
The NSHS critical mission “Intelligence and Warning” expressed the need 
to detect terrorist activities, but it does not include firefighters, citizens, or even law 
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enforcement in its recommendation.  This view is supported by Mark Lowenthal, whose 
book on intelligence supported the exclusion of firefighters by omission (2006).  
Although he drew an obvious distinction between intelligence and information, he clearly 
assumed only law enforcement or federal intelligence agents are able to collect 
information.  Most literature the aspect of prevention and protection under the NSHS 
referred to the intelligence and law enforcement community.  The detection of 
intelligence information is usually limited to the Intelligence Community (IC), which 
often even excludes local law enforcement.  
However, the National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) called for a shift from 
status quo intelligence to a transformation of the IC through the doctrine of integration 
(U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2005).  In the NIS, the IC is specifically 
directed to attract, engage, and unify an innovative and results-focused IC workforce. The 
NIS recommended a paradigm shift in the intelligence process (DHS, 2005). One such 
paradigm shift could include the expansion of the reporting of information of intelligence 
value to include local fire departments.   
d. Adaptive Changes 
The fire department is known as an organization with hundreds of years of 
tradition unimpeded by progress.  It is an industry widely known for its rigidity and 
extreme resistance to adaptive change.  Adaptive change refers to an organization’s 
ability to assess and alter current processes and/or outputs to meet a change in demands 
or the environment.  In the book, Organization Behavior, the authors claimed that in 
order for planned change programs to be effective employees must be aware of the need, 
believe in its value, and be willing to change their behavior (Hellriegel, Slocum, & 
Woodman, 1998). Firefighters have not been convinced of the need or value of changing 
their behavior. 
According to Heifetz and Linsky, the single most common source of 
leadership failure in politics, community life, business or the nonprofit sector is that 
people, especially those in authority, treat adaptive challenges like technical problems 
(2002).  Leaders approach issues from either a technical point of view or an adaptive 
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point of view.  The book described the difference between these two points, and it clearly 
identified the danger of adaptive leadership.  It also offered some suggestions on how to 
avoid obstacles and navigate changes of a non-technical nature.  
Another prominent school of thought congruent to Heifetz and Linsky is 
the idea that cultural impediments to change may be hindering homeland security in 
general and the ability to meet the expectations of the critical missions defined in the 
NSHS specifically.  In his thesis describing collaboration, communication, and 
information sharing challenges in Utah, Robert L. Flowers, a graduate of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, explained that purchasing equipment for first responders without a 
strategy for change is wasteful and will not fix the problems (2006). Bellavita confirmed 
the need to manage change when he states that the next significant national event will 
create an environment that supports if not demands substantial changes (2006). He is not 
alone in this prediction.   
Vincent J. Doherty, in his NPS thesis, Metrics for Success: Using Metrics 
in Exercises to Assess the Preparedness of the Fire Service in Homeland Security called 
for a major conceptual change in order for first responders to become more prepared for 
any hazard (2004).  Alicia L. Welch, in her thesis Terrorism Awareness and Education as 
a Prevention Strategy for First Responders, expressed the need for a complete revamping 
of existing policies, training, and response duties if the fire department is to be effective 
in homeland security (2006).  
In contrast, some believe that adequate funding, equipment, and training 
for state and local first responders would solve future homeland security needs (Gilmore 
Commission, 2003).  Most leaders in the fire service throughout the United States focus 
on tools and equipment as opposed to change management (J. Harmes, personal 
communication, 2007). Moreover, this belief is demonstrated in the criteria for the Fire 
Act Grant process, which leaves no provisions for adaptive change or leadership 
initiatives (Federal Emergency Management Agency, Fire Act Grant).  
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2. Cultural Challenges 
Heillriegel defined organizational culture as a multifaceted system of shared 
beliefs, expectations, ideas, values, attitudes, and behaviors (Hellriegel et al., 1998).  
Edgar H. Schein defined organizational culture as a pattern of shared behavior based on 
assumptions that the group has learned as it solved its problems.  These assumptions have 
proven to be valid and therefore can be taught to new members as the correct way to 
perceive, think, and feel (Schein, 1985).  Schein’s views have been supported by other 
experts who also believe that organizational culture develops as a result of external 
adaptation and survival, as well as internal integration (Hellriegel et al., 1998). 
Heroism and courage are beliefs and expectations shared by all firefighters.  A 
firefighter who dies in the process of rescuing a citizen is viewed as an honorable hero 
who made the ultimate sacrifice. However, the majority of injuries to and deaths of 
firefighters do not occur during attempts to rescue citizens or mitigate an incident. 
Rather, emergent causes are risky behaviors and the refusal to adhere to directives 
administered by authority figures.   Moreover, a slowly increasing perception among fire 
service leaders is the belief that a culture that supports impulsive behavior, intolerance; 
machismo, invulnerability, anti-authority, and lack of accountability are major 
contributors to firefighter injuries and deaths (International Association of Fire Chiefs 
(IAFC), 2002).  
In spite of this, few leaders consider that these same behaviors are a major 
hindrance to integration, cooperation, and collaboration with outside agencies and other 
public safety organizations as well.  Instead, they continue to fix these cultural issues 
with technical solutions despite the fact that several technical reference models have 
failed to improve communication and collaboration (Tolk, 2003). 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This research project will add to a very limited body of knowledge specific to the 
future role of the fire industry in support of the National Strategy for Homeland Security.  
It will identify emerging homeland security issues facing the fire service in the next five 
to ten years and provide strategies to address those concerns.  Immediate consumers of 
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this project include fire departments, law enforcement and other first responders.  
Homeland security leaders, including members of the intelligence community, fusions 
centers, and Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) could also benefit from the results of this 
research through improved and increased situational awareness. 
E. METHOD 
The Delphi Method was used in this study to elicit expert opinions in a 
systematic, confidential manner to explore the future role of the fire service in homeland 
security (Thomas, 2007). This research process requires the use of a multi-round survey 
process to structure confidential groups communicating around a complex issue (Thomas, 
2007).  
Questions were initially created based on interview responses from two select 
groups: Four members of the International Association of Fire Chiefs (identified as FC-A 
through D) and five NPS cohort members of the fire service (identified as Cohort).  
Information was gathered from the FC group by email responses, face to face, and 
telephone interviews.   
Both groups of subject matter experts were asked questions using open-ended 
questions to glean information on their experiences, perceptions, opinions, feelings, and 
knowledge relating to homeland security (Hocevar & Wollman). Responses from the FC 
group were synthesized into categories and constructs based on the results of open 
coding. This information was then evaluated, analyzed, and used as a guide to determine 
the concepts and variables to be measured during the Delphi study.    
The first round of questions was then developed based on the analysis of 
responses and was presented to a second set of subject matter experts who agreed to be 
participants of the Delphi study.  These members, identified and color coded as DM-1 
through DM-6 were queried with three different rounds of questions.  Each set of 
questions was derived from DM members’ responses to the previous questions. 
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The result of this study provides valuable insight into the future role of 
firefighters in homeland security.  Additionally, the data supports  the idea of developing 
a strategy to expand the fire service mission beyond response and recovery. 
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW   
Chapter I has identified problems with applying tactical short-term goals to 
prepare for, prevent and mitigate complex, and unconventional threats of terrorism, or 
large scale disasters.  It suggests that these dynamic events require innovative 
unconventional approaches to meeting the goals of the National Preparedness Systems, 
and has asserted the need for fire service leaders to anticipate and explore its role in 
homeland security in the next five to ten years; develop long range strategies to support 
the NSHS; manage mission shifts, and it addresses leadership and cultural challenges.  
This chapter also discusses relevant literature. 
Chapter II examines historical approaches to leadership and homeland security 
leadership challenges to strategic planning and adaptive changes in the fire service.  It 
discusses why these may present problems in dealing with new asymmetrical threats of 
terrorism.  It questions whether traditional autocratic or transactional leadership styles 
and the organization’s scalar structure of the past five decades should be modified to fit 
today’s homeland security needs.  This chapter examines collaboration barriers to 
prevention, preparedness and response to terrorist attacks and major disasters. It also 
discusses the need to develop strategies to build collaborative relationships and examines 
a successful non-emergency statewide collaborative effort.   
Chapter III is an analysis of Phase 1 of a two part Delphi mixed method process.  
Three groups participated in this process: (a) four fire chiefs (FC); (b) five members from 
the fire discipline enrolled in NPS (Cohorts); and (c) six fire service alumni of the NPS 
program (Delphi members or DM).  This chapter describes how members of the three 
groups were selected.  It discusses how initial questions were developed, responses 
grouped, categorized, and prevailing themes identified.  Using open first order and 
second order coding, an analysis exploring patterns, themes, conflicts, and problems 
associated with responses to emerging issues is presented.  This analysis discusses the 
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fire service’s leadership, cultural, and collaborative challenges as well as the fire service 
role in prevention and detection of terrorist acts.  Key areas of concern identified from 
this analysis include response capabilities, intelligence, leadership, and collaboration.  
These prevailing themes were used to create questions for Phase 2. 
Chapter IV is an analysis of Phase 2 of the two-part Delphi process.  Opinions 
expressed by DM members in Phase 1 generated additional interesting ideas that gave 
rise to a second set of questions sent to the same DM group.  Responses to questions 
about the fire service role in homeland security as it relates to intelligence, leadership 
issues, and collaboration are grouped, coded, and examined using the same system as 
described in Phase 1.  Analyses of these responses were used to form the conclusion and 
recommendations described in Chapter V.   
Chapter V offers conclusions based on responses to emerging issues in the fire 
service: leadership challenges, collaboration barriers to partnerships, and whether to 
expand the fire service role to include prevention and detection of terrorism.  The author 
used the synthesized views of these subject matter experts to explore strategies and make 
recommendations on the fire service’s role in homeland security in the next five to ten 
years.   
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II. LEADERSHIP ROLE IN HOMELAND SECURITY  
After action reviews and the subsequent development of national homeland 
security strategies have validated the need for the fire service to redirect its mission, 
anticipate and navigate change, build partnerships, and identify and eliminate barriers to 
collaboration (DHS, 2005).  To do this, the industry will need to create proactive and 
preventive strategic plans designed to engage the community, other first responders, and 
public, private, and non-profit stakeholders. Navigating these adaptive changes will 
require collaboration and strong, progressive leadership from all areas of the fire service 
but most assuredly from the fire chief.  
A. LEADERSHIP/STRATEGIC THINKING 
Much has been written on the management function of leading and the role of 
leaders in an organization.  Indeed, do a search for the word leadership and Google offers 
180,000,000 search sites.  This list includes the research of scholars, psychologists, and 
executive leaders of public, private, and nonprofit organizations who offer many concepts 
and theories (Cochran, 2006).  An entire thesis could be written on the various views of 
leadership.   
The scope of this paper is not intended to address these assorted leadership styles 
and approaches.  Rather, it will examine historical approaches to leadership in the fire 
service and homeland security leadership challenges to strategic planning, adaptive 
changes, collaboration, integration, and interoperability in the fire service.    
1. Historical Approaches 
In his book Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, Bryson 
argued that it is helpful for an organization to look forward by first looking backward 
(2004, p. 138). Likewise, a historical review of leadership in the fire industry should 
prove to be a useful technique for measuring effectiveness and determining the path of 
future leadership.   
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Traditional leadership in the fire service has been modeled after the military 
leadership style practiced during World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War 
(Cochran, 2006, p.16).  This model includes three basic leadership styles: autocratic, 
democratic, or laissez-faire.  Through the years, these leadership styles have been used by 
fire chiefs, chief officers, and managers of individual fire stations.   Of the three styles, 
democratic leadership has proven to be more successful in most situations in the fire 
service (Cochran, 2006, p.16).   
However, many fire chiefs believe adhering to the paramilitary organization 
structure mandates the use of authoritative leadership (Shepard, 1999).  This assumption, 
which is likely based on the historical tradition of past chiefs, who practiced autocratic 
leadership, is still prevalent today. 
Most fire departments operate in a scalar, paramilitary, pyramidal structure.  
Authority is centralized at the top where decisions are made and information is 
transmitted from the top down in an uninterrupted chain of authority or chain of 
command.  This allows decisions to be made at the top of the structure, information to be 
filtered down, and standard operating procedures to be implemented uniformly 
throughout the organization (International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA) 
1989, pp. 11-25).   
During the past five decades, fire service leaders have been able to navigate 
successfully in this pyramidal environment.  Traditionally, scalar structures have worked 
well in emergency and non-emergency situations.  Organizational standards such as unity 
of command, span of control, division of labor and discipline serve as sound management 
principles (IFSTA, 1989). Basic strategies and tactics are effectively executed on the fire 
ground.  The span of control is kept manageable, information is centralized, and the chain 
of command is maintained. However, in today’s era of “lone wolf” terrorist, leaderless 
groups, Al Qaeda cells, and threat networks where extremists, defeated in one area, 
regenerate elsewhere as if they were starfish should this system be modified?   
In the book The Starfish and the Spider – The Unstoppable Power of Leaderless 
Organizations, Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom argued that there is a great deal of 
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power in leaderless groups (2006).  The authors used a series of leaderless groups to 
demonstrate the power of a decentralized organization. Alcoholics Anonymous (AA), 
founded by Bill Wilson, is an example of how an organization can flourish when there is 
no appointed leader.   AA has been in existence since 1938 and has over two million 
members.  Any party of two or more people can start a group and the only requirement 
for membership is a desire to stop drinking.  The program has twelve steps and twelve 
traditions.  The traditions are written for the sole purpose of keeping the group leaderless.   
AA is analogous to a starfish.  Brafman and Beckstrom explained that when an 
arm is severed from a starfish, the fish grows another arm, and in some types of starfish, 
the severed limb becomes another starfish (2006).  There is no leader or head of a 
starfish; in order for it to move one of its arms, it has to convince the other arms of the 
idea.  The same is true for AA, where decisions are made by group consensus.  By 
contrast, the spider does have a head (leader)   If a spider loses one of its legs, it may be 
able to continue to live, but if the spider’s head is cut off, it will cease to exist (Brafman 
& Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 33-35). 
In the case of the global war on terrorism, when attacked, decentralized 
organizations become even more decentralized (Brafman & Beckstrom, 2006, pp. 33-35).  
Instead of dealing with one terrorist group, the United States is confronted with a 
multitude of groups that share a common desire to attack democracy and thus the United 
States. Public safety and military organizations in America, although multi-tiered, are 
centralized structures struggling to fight non-state terrorists operating without clearly 
defined leadership. 
Furthermore, according to James R. Locker III, Executive Director of the Project 
on National Security Reform, the National Security System, used by the president and 
funded by congress to manage national power, do not permit the agility required to 
protect the United States and its interests (2008, pp. 19-27).  
This system was based on lessons learned from World War II and designed to 
fight the Cold War.  Current exposure to terrorism and terrorist cells is vastly different  
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from exposure during the Cold War.  These threats demand more effective 
communication and a common vision and organizational culture (Locker, 2008, pp. 19-
27). 
The combination of the effects of this new form of terrorism and its increasing 
threats globally and domestically along with natural disasters and potentials for pandemic 
health crisis are forcing leaders to realize the need for a new way of thinking.   More than 
ever, these disruptive events are creating the need for transformational leadership, 
collective leadership and strategic thinking across the board (Weeks 2007; Welch, 2006). 
Since terrorists are not operating from a centralized posture and since according to 
Brafman and Beckstrom the best opponent for a starfish organization is another starfish, 
first responder, military and intelligence communities should closely examine the effects, 
or lack there of, their organizational and leadership structures have on homeland security 
(2006).  For instance, in the fire department is there a fundamental or cultural obstruction, 
ingrained in the traditional leadership and organizational structure of the fire department 
that hinders collaboration, partnership, adaptive change, collective leadership, and thus 
homeland security?   
2. Organizational Structure and Leadership 
Although the paramilitary environment in the fire service has served leaders well 
in both emergency and administrative capacities, it has also presented challenges and 
contributed to a rigid culture that is unwilling to change (Week, 2007).  Some of the 
disadvantages of strict adherence to this paramilitary structure include the lack of 
flexibility, progress, inclusion, innovation, and teamwork involved in the decision-
making and planning processes.  Decisions, strategies, goals, and objectives are 
determined by those at the top of the pyramid.  The lack of flexibility results in an 
inability to adjust to a growing and changing environment (Doherty, 2004). 
According to James MacGregor Burns, leadership can be divided into two 
fundamentally different types: transactional and transformational.  Transactional 
leadership is based on an exchange of values. It is a “quid pro quo” system where a 
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relationship is established based on the agreement that rewards will be given for a certain 
level of service or participation (Burns, 1979, pp. 19-20).   
In the fire service, the reward may be in the form of a promotion, appointment, 
reassignment, or some other form of acknowledgment (Weeks, 2007).   As long as the 
rules are followed, firefighters and company officers have very little contact with the fire 
chief or in some cases, other chief officers.  Transactional leadership does not allow for 
expansion, innovation, or strategic thinking (Weeks, 2007). Transactional leadership is 
common in the fire service where meritocracy is sometimes the end result and strategic 
change is not encouraged (Weeks, 2007). 
In many departments, the rank and file is often not included in the planning 
process.   As a result, some of these members are uncomfortable with sending ideas up 
the pyramid. In some cases, use of the chain of command suppresses the flow of 
innovative ideas and strategic thinking on the company officer and firefighter level. This 
could be due in part to unresponsiveness or lack of empowerment.  At any rate, since in 
some cases meetings are only attended by chief officers, and since chief officers tend to 
agree with the fire chief, there is danger of creating a group think environment.   
Perhaps as a result of this restrictive chain of communication, company officers 
and middle managers expect the top brass to resolve both easy and complex problems.  
Whether it is intentional or because of the power structure, these officers make few 
decisions.  This restrictive behavior also limits participation and collaboration with other 
members of the first responder community.  Participation in the planning process 
facilitates communication, synthesizes interests and values, and promotes successful 
implementation and accountability (Bryson, 2004, p. 6).  David Butler, quoted in the 
book The Leadership Challenge by James Kouzes and Barry Posner, supported the need 
to give people on the front lines proper vision, training, and responsibility so they can act 
on decisions (1995, 12; Welch, 2006). 
Consequently, the pyramidal chain of command structure and the practice of 
traditional autocratic and/or transactional leadership style could obstruct an 
organization’s ability to grow and meet current expectations on a fundamental level 
 18
(Weeks, 2007; Welch, 2006).  It stifles progress, cuts off opportunities for other members 
of the organization, as well as outside agencies, to contribute, and it could obstruct the 
organization’s ability to adapt to a changing environment and/or prepare for the future.  
3. Leadership Failures/Successes 
However, some may point out that the pyramid chain of command structure, in 
several cases, has not stifled the progress and advancement of good leadership in certain 
organizations.  Quite the contrary, there are some leaders operating within the 
paramilitary structure, who are able to influence followers to sacrifice self-interest for the 
good of the group, and go far beyond transactional boundaries.  
These leaders seek solutions from the lowest level upward because they practice 
transformational leadership.  Transformational leadership is a relationship of mutual 
stimulation and elevation that converts followers to leaders.  Transformational leaders 
behave in ways that make themselves role models, motivate and inspire others, and 
approach situations in new ways (Burns, 1979, pp. 19-20). This model, if executed, could 
turn followers into starfish. 
Some leaders have made marked progress towards empowerment and 
decentralization within the pyramid environment of their organization.   New York Police 
Chief Bill Bratton provides an example of how to demonstrate exceptional tipping point 
leadership in spite of the system and its culture.   
In the book Blue Ocean Strategy W. Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne introduced 
this concept to describe organizations or businesses that have expanded outside of normal 
competition to create new territory or new ideas (2005).  The gist of the matter is that 
“Blue Ocean Strategy” operates outside of the known market or today’s existence by 
applying strategic principles that are effective in spite of the status quo.  Tipping point 
leadership is based on the principle that in any organization there are people, acts, and 




2005, p.151).  In tipping point leadership, leaders demonstrate to managers how to 
overcome political, financial, cultural, and morale hurdles to identify and capture future 
ideas today.  
Chief Bratton’s accomplishments serve as an excellent example.  In 1994, as the 
recently appointed police chief, Bratton inherited the entire gamut of problems.  New 
York City had one of the worst crime records in the country including, but not limited to, 
murders, muggings, armed robberies, and Mafia hits.  The department was entrenched in 
turf wars and politics.  Additionally, morale was extremely low, confidence and trust was 
clearly lacking, and budget cuts had stripped the police department.  Using tipping point 
leadership, in less than two years Bratton was able to overcome all of these obstacles to 
create a “Blue Ocean Strategy” that changed police status quo operations and turned New 
York City into the safest large city in the United States (Kim & Mauborgne, 2005, pp. 
148-150).   
He accomplished this by creating a revolutionized policing strategy that has been 
adopted by law enforcement organizations through out the United States.  Although he 
operated in a paramilitary, centralized environment, he pushed responsibility and 
accountability down to every level.  At regularly scheduled meetings, he made his leaders 
responsible for any crime activity in their precincts; this was unheard of.  How could 
someone make law enforcement responsible for a criminal’s action?  His managers had to 
accept responsibility and give be accountable in front of their peers and others.  
Moreover, he put managers back in touch with the public.  They were required to ride the 
subway—at night no less.  The effects of Bratton’s actions were astounding! 
There are several schools of thought on the cause or source of leadership 
successes and failures.  According to Kouzes and Posner, a leader must accomplish five 
basic things to succeed and get “out of the box” performance from members of an 
organization: challenge the process, inspire a shared vision, enable others to act; model 
the way, and encourage the heart (Kouzes & Posner, 1995, p. 12).   Leaders must 




proactive strategic performance.  They must inspire a shared vision by engaging and 
soliciting participation in the planning process from the rank and file, chief officers, and 
other stakeholders.  
In the case of the fire service, the mission and vision, though somewhat similar to 
the past, has changed since 9/11.  But there have not been any formal revisions (Weeks, 
2007; Welch, 2006).   The result of engaging firefighters from every rank as well as 
stakeholders to participate in the planning process will enable and empower them to act 
and make decisions. These leaders will demonstrate or model the way for others to ensure 
resilience and the positive succession of up coming leaders.  Leaders must encourage the 
heart, by keeping the goals up front and attainable.  Just as most firefighters are inspired 
and encouraged to participate in fire prevention to reduce the number of fire deaths, 
going forward, leaders must stay connected to all stakeholders, in order to encourage the 
heart.  
Bryson’s definition of leadership is congruent to Kouzes and Posner’s.  He 
defined it as “the inspiration and mobilization of others to undertake collective action in 
pursuit of the common good” (2004).  Although this definition is used to describe a single 
leader, leadership in public and nonprofit organizations is a collective endeavor involving 
many people and many roles.  Bryson argued that leading is a strategic thinking plan and 
that there is not a plan unless the leader is actively involved and is leading the plan; 
otherwise it is not going to work (2004, p. 26). According to him, lack of leadership is the 
reason most strategic plans fail.  Likewise, it is leadership, not the plan that accounts for 
60 percent of organizations’ successes (2004, p. 298).   
On the other hand, Heifetz and Linsky believe the most common source of 
leadership failure in politics, community life, business, or the non-profit sector is that 
people in authority treat adaptive challenges like technical problems (2002).  Leaders can 
resolve technical problems by applying current know-how, but when it comes to adaptive 
issues, the leader should create a collaborative environment and coach the people with the 
issue to resolve the problems (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002).   
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This explains the leadership issues in some fire departments where the fire chief 
makes all of the decisions and the solutions are designed to correct operations issues.  
The lack of strategic thinking and planning keeps the organization struggling to react as 
problems occur.  The custom of top management making all of the decisions and dealing 
with all issues as operational problems results in dysfunctional leadership.  On every 
level, firefighters, station officers, and chief officers are uncomfortable making decisions 
and resolving issues.  They look to the next level of command to deal with the concern.  
This behavior, or more appropriately this culture, has been created and perpetuated by 
fire chiefs who employ an autocratic leadership style.  Many of these chiefs are simply 
duplicating the shared values and beliefs that were passed on to them by previous chiefs.   
However, Bratton represents the exception rather than the norm.  Instead of 
creating tipping point leadership or “Blue Ocean Strategies,” most public safety 
organizations are led by transactional, autocratic leaders who only expect subordinates to 
uphold their end of a predefined agreement.  Under strict chain of command and 
pyramidal organizations, members are rarely considered or invited to participate in any 
planning or decision-making processes (A. Welch, personal communication April 10, 
2008).  
Brafman and Beckstrom claimed, and many agree, that the people in positions of 
power need to understand that great ideas come from the people who are closest to the 
idea (2006).  In the fire service, this means including people who have the best 
knowledge and experience as opposed to those with the highest rank.  
A quick glance at the roster of the alumni members and current participants of the 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security Master’s Degree Program provides good 
examples of the aforementioned theory. These members are innovative strategic thinkers 
and leaders who may or may not have the title of chief officers but who certainly can 
contribute to homeland security in all levels of government.  However, in some fire 
departments, which are based on rank and command structure, they are not even 
considered to participate in homeland security initiatives.   
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In addition to the organization’s failure to take advantage of its subject matter 
experts, this lack of inclusion and mentoring of rank and file members creates gaps in 
experience and lengthens the learning curve of newly promoted officers when senior 
chief officers leave the organization.  In the next five years, as members of the fire 
service who are “Baby Boomers” will retire, this could present a serious problem. 
According to one of the survey participants, DM-4, traditionally, fire departments  do not 
have built-in management and supervisory mandates for newly promoted officers to 
correct this problem.  Emerging leaders who lack both administrative and operational 
experience could make decisions that are deadly and costly to the organization.  
In one particular case, after action reviews of an incident that led to the death of a 
firefighter revealed that the administrative decision of a newly appointed assistant chief 
to disregard seniority and experience when staffing units resulted in the response of a fire 
company where the senior member had less than five years experience.   Many who 
participated in the lessons learned process of this incident believe, in this case, that the 
lack of experience likely contributed to the tragedy.  DM-4 argued, the lesson here is this:  
It is essential to empower emerging leaders early in their career before they assume a 
formal role of leadership. 
On the other hand, some might reason that since leadership in the fire industry is 
based on leadership styles of old and since these styles should be revised, the retirement 
of senior members who practice these styles will impact the organization positively.  One 
fire chief views attrition as a positive action and believes that retirement of some senior 
members will open doors that allow for better recruitment, retention, and career 
advancement of innovative employees wishing to advance the vision and mission of the 
organization. 
4. Adaptive vs. Technical Solutions 
The focus and value placed on technical experience and operational solutions is 
another organizational issue that is ingrained in the fire service culture that could hinder 
collaboration, partnership, adaptive change, collective leadership and thus homeland 
security. In some fire departments, a leader’s worth is often measured by the number of 
fires they have fought and certifications they have achieved.  High angle roper rescue, 
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smoke divers, trench rescue, and hazardous material are just a few of the technical 
training and certifications available.  Training and certifications are extremely important, 
and members who are trained have successfully contributed to the mitigation of a 
countless number of emergency response incidents.  
Nevertheless, the problem with relying mainly on technical experience is that the 
environment has changed; it is more disruptive, and is too complex to be solved by 
technical application alone.  The following is just a sample of why technical application 
cannot be used to address today’s issues: 
• Will not work on homeland security and all hazard problems 
• Tend to be short term and reactionary 
• Not conducive to strategic thinking and planning 
• Does not allow for expansion or broader view 
• Risk decreasing instead of increasing public value  
According to Ronald A. Heifetz and Marty Linsky in their book Leadership on 
the Line, there is the tendency to treat adaptive problems with technical solutions (2002).  
Technical problems are problems that people have the necessary know-how and 
procedures to resolve quickly. This application does not work when facing an adaptive 
problem. There is a list of problems that cannot be resolved by authoritative and 
administrative means, or even standard operating procedures (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002, p. 
14).   
Consider this as an example of technical versus adaptive change.  An electrical 
shortage causes a fire in a citizen’s attic.  The fire department arrives, has the electricity 
shut off, and extinguishes the fire.  This is an example of technical solution that 
successfully resolved the issue.  On the other hand, if the fire is caused by the repeated 
careless behavior of family members, it will probably happen again.  The fire department 
would have to devise an adaptive solution — fire prevention education — to convince the 
family to correct their behavior to prevent future fires.  In order to do this, the family 
must recognize the need to make changes and address the issue of carelessness.  
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The tendency to focus on technical issues as opposed to adaptive or strategic 
solutions permeates the fire service and can lead to dysfunctional leadership (Heifetz & 
Linsky, 2002, p. 14).  As a result, people look for the fire chief to resolve all problems.  
When people rely on top leaders to resolve or address adaptive change they tend to avoid 
communication and conflicts, both of which are essential to managing adaptive 
challenges (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002, p. 105).  
Some may argue that the fire service should not be about the business of long-
range planning, strategic thinking, or creating “Blue Ocean Strategies.”  Rather, it is a 
first response organization whose service delivery only involves technical solutions.  
Firefighters are in the business of putting fires out and their rapid responses and actions 
have saved thousands of lives.  This has earned the industry a top place on the list of 
agencies revered by the public.  Firefighters risk their lives daily to reduce damage and 
save lives.  Many in the industry feel that nothing further should be expected from these 
heroes and if they are allowed to perfect the ability to respond and mitigate emergencies, 
then there is nothing operationally that cannot be resolved.  Indeed, the fire department 
has enjoyed 200 years of successful service to the public.   
However, lessons learned from past disastrous events prove that employing the 
same short-term, technical solutions to complex and dynamic acts of nature and terrorism 
are costly, deadly, and insufficient (National Commission, 2005, p.567).   Events of this 
magnitude are adaptive problems and technical solutions do not work on them.  Adaptive 
changes require experience, new discoveries, inclusion, collaboration, collective 
leadership, and adjustments from a variety of organizations, businesses, and communities 
(Heifetz & Linksy, 2002; 13).   
The fire department is not alone in its application of technical solutions to 
adaptive problems. On September 11, 2001, the United States was forced to face an 
adaptive challenge that had been festering for years.  For the first time, Americans, 
collectively, felt vulnerable in the homeland.  The initial tendency of government 
officials was to treat terrorism as a problem of security systems.  While military, police, 
criminal justice and intelligence operations needed revamping, terrorism represents an 
adaptive challenge to civil liberties and the long standing divide between Christian West 
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and Muslim East (Heifetz & Linksy, 2002; 13).  Moreover, the National Security System 
does not easily facilitate the development and implementation of long-term, 
comprehensive national security policies designed to diminish the probabilities of threats 
before they occur (Locher, 2008).   
Since 9/11, first response organizations in all disciplines have been struggling to 
redefine their mission and establish their role in homeland security.  What is glaringly 
obvious is the fact that no one leader or organization is able to prevent or respond to 
catastrophic disasters single-handedly.  Mark Gerezon defined it best in his book titled 
Leading through Conflict when he stated that there is a class of problems facing this 
nation that cannot be solved by individual leaders or a single organization (2006, p. 199).  
As is the case with homeland security, the fire service needs the coordinated participation 
of many groups, including rank and file members, those from other first responder 
communities, and those who may be unorganized and voiceless.  And while there are 
individual leaders who, formally and informally, command authority, leadership, in the 
case of homeland security, cannot be reduced to any single person (Gerzon, 2006).  
Accordingly, strategies designed to facilitate collaboration, interdependence, and 
synthesis with other first responders as well as public, nonprofit, and business 
communities is essential.   
5. Strategic Planning and Change 
If the fire service is going to move forward to ensure and enhance its role in 
homeland security, its leaders must learn a new way of thinking. This new way of 
thinking should be guided by both internal and external planning efforts, which will 
ultimately result in a change from status quo service delivery. Rapid response and 
recovery represent the traditional status quo service delivery mission in the fire 
department.  The culture is predisposed to a reactive response posture. Without a doubt, 
firefighters take pride in how quickly they arrive on an emergency scene to mitigate a 
crisis and protect the community.  The larger the scope of the emergency, the more 
equipment and resources are deployed to manage it.  No one could argue that these  
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strategies and tactics work very well in ordinary conventional fire emergencies; but they 
are woefully inadequate in response and in preparation for catastrophic events (Doherty, 
2004; Welch, 2006).  
Presiding over an industry entrenched in tradition and accustomed to always 
reacting to make a bad situation better, these leaders must understand and get their 
members to understand that the cheese has moved. Who Moved my Cheese is a story 
about change.  It takes place in a maze and describes how two mice and two little people 
deal with the fact that the cheese in the maze has been moved.   Spencer Johnson, M.D., 
the author, uses cheese as a metaphor of what people want to achieve; in other words, 
their goals.  The maze represents where people spend time looking for what they want, in 
other words, a strategic plan (2002, p. 94). 
Like the two little people who are continually looking in the same place for their 
cheese and caught up in the maze, many in the fire service believe that the mission and 
focus of the fire service and its service delivery approaches should not be changed.  
However, the environment has become more demanding and more complex than the days 
of simple firefighting — “putting the wet stuff on the red stuff.” The nation now faces a 
plethora of threats including, but not limited to: natural disasters, hazardous material 
releases, CBERN, pandemics, and domestic and international acts of terrorism.  
Some have suggested, and this author agrees, that traditional leadership practices 
and response capabilities are not meeting the current demand (Weeks, 2007). And while 
fire service leaders have acknowledged the need to prepare for future terrorist attacks as 
well as the mitigation of all risks, they have not developed new strategies to meet these 
challenges (Weeks, 2007).  Pre-existing systems and pre-9/11 standards of practice are 
still being used (Weeks, 2007). 
For fire service professionals, it is important to plan for the future now and not 
wait until it is forced upon the fire department. For example, fire departments in the past 




services and more recently should be thinking how to address our terrorism threats 
(Lacey & Valentine, 2007).  Thinking strategically is the key to define the fire service 
role in disaster preparedness and prevention.  
Using John M. Bryson’s definition of strategic planning, the fire department 
should develop an orderly and controlled proactive procedure to determine the decisions 
and actions that will be used to shape and guide what the fire industry is, what services it 
provides, and why it provides those services (2004).  The results of making fundamental 
disciplined efforts to define what the industry does could mean that nothing should 
change, that the service delivery should remain the same.  Or it could be that going 
through this process demands drastic mission changes to meet future homeland security 
and disaster preparedness needs.  Regardless of what the outcome proves to be, one of the 
greatest benefits of going through a strategic planning process for the fire department is it 
will enable leaders to learn to think strategically (Bryson, 2004, p. 6).  
Leading the industry from a traditional reactive culture to strategic thinking and 
planning conducive to all hazards and terrorism preventive decisions and actions as well 
as interdependence, collaboration, and integration with other agencies is a daunting task 
(Weeks, 2007).  Added to this dilemma of shifting mission, some would say, is the fact 
that there is not a single voice to represent the fire service.   
The National Fire Protection Association has been establishing standards on fire 
service delivery for over forty years.  However, these standards are only 
recommendations and have no force of law.  Furthermore, while the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), the International Association of Firefighters (IAFF), 
International Association of Black Professional Firefighters (IABPFF), and a myriad of 
other minority organizations all have voices in the fire service, typically, these voices do 
not sing the same tunes.   Each of these organizations has developed strategic plans but 
they are independent of one another.  This makes it difficult to establish strategic plans, 
frameworks, and structures with national endorsement by the fire industry that could 
result in legislative, homeland security, and mission changes. 
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On the other hand, some leaders believe that the IAFC is the lead voice for the 
fire industry, citing its role with homeland security initiatives and the strategic planning 
documents currently completed by the IAFC as proof of its position.  As an organization 
of chiefs and chief officers, the IAFC should take the lead to fuse lead representatives 
from the IAFF, IABPFF, other minority groups, and the volunteer and combination fire 
departments into a team and develop a unified strategy that represents the voice of the 
fire department. Although the IAFC and other fire service organizations have scrambled 
to develop strategic plans since the 9/11 attacks, these plans typically include only the 
insight and ideas of its individual members.   
This limited point of view is not the best use of planning approaches.  Strategic 
planning is useful only if it influences strategic thought, action, and learning; and 
strategic thought, action, and learning should take many sources into consideration 
including the shifting mission; and the vision and expectations of the community, other 
first responder agencies, public and nonprofit organizations, citizens, and members of the 
business community (Bryson, 2004).  
Contributions from all of these stakeholders are essential to formulating a plan of 
action to facilitate adaptive changes.   Synthesizing their thoughts, actions, and 
experiences into a strategy to facilitate change will require strong leadership from the top 
and cooperation among the rank and file.  Here, Bryson’s “Strategic Change Cycle” is 
appropriate to join key internal and external decision makers.  Bryson offers that 
information, support, and commitment from major stakeholders are vital to the success of 
strategic planning (2004, p. 65).  Additionally, members of the first responder community 
will need to be convinced of the need to change, to do what they have never done before, 
as well as be shown the path to get there. Leaders must realize the purpose of strategy is 
to change an environment in a way that makes it possible for all members to operate 
(Bryson, 6).  This will not be an easy task because of the fire service and other agencies’ 
inherent resistance to change (Doherty, 2004; Weeks, 2007; Welch; 2006).   But the 




Today’s terrorists operate in a decentralized, leaderless, environment and present 
a different challenge to homeland security efforts.  While leaderless groups are very 
powerful, they are not invincible.  However, to be effective in the war on terror, public 
safety, military, and intelligence organizations may need to examine organizational 
structures to identify obstacles to homeland security.   
The paramilitary pyramid structure of the fire service has served the industry well 
for the past 200 years. However, strict adherence to this system and/or transactional 
management style could obstruct or inhibit innovation and contributions.  It could also 
hinder collaboration, inclusion, partnerships, and adaptive change, which in turn inhibits 
homeland security.   These are essential components to the prevention, preparedness, and 
response to current and future threats of terrorism and potential natural disasters. 
On the other hand, there are some innovative transformational leaders working 
within this same system re-defining their departments, their missions, and are learning a 
new way of thinking.  Unfortunately, leadership training is not readily available in some 
departments.  Fire service leaders should consider improving the effort to inspire, provide 
modeling, and leadership training to their members early in their career. 
The treatment of all problems as operational issues can contribute to 
dysfunctional organizations and leadership failure.  Leaders must learn to discern the 
difference between operational or technical problems and adaptive or strategic challenges 
and shift solutions accordingly.   
Leaders should also develop strategic plans to improve strategic thinking and to 
identify goals to incorporate emerging trends, ideas, and requirements to meet current and 
future homeland security issues.  Failure to make these strategic changes will have 
adverse effects on the safety of firefighters, other first responders, and the public 
(National Commission; 2005; Bryson, 2004).   Although the fire department does not 
have single voice of representation, the IAFC and the IAFF, the two largest groups, are 
able to collaborate on common issues.  
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B. COLLABORATION, INTEGRATION, INTEROPERABILITY 
Homeland security is an exceedingly complex mission that requires agencies, 
organizations, and individuals from many tiers of public and private sectors, working, 
training, and exercising together for the common purpose of preventing terrorist threats to 
people and property (Pelfrey, 2005).   Today’s environment has become increasingly 
uncertain and chaotic.  It has also become increasingly interconnected.  To navigate in 
these surroundings, public, private, and non-profit organizations must think strategically, 
translate their insights into strategies, develop and implement strategies, and they must 
build sustainable coalitions to support the implementation of the strategy.   
Likewise, the prevention, preparation, and response to terrorist attacks will 
require the collaborative, interdependent efforts of firefighters, law enforcement, 
emergency medical, public health, public utility, public works, security guards, taxi 
drivers, the intelligence community, the armed forces, citizens, businesses, and public 
and non-profit organizations.  
Katrina exposed a major lack of collaboration among local, state, and federal 
agencies, which consequently created chaos, animosity, mistrust, inadequate 
communication, and a failure to cooperate. These issues are still resonating today, three 
years later (Locher, 2008). Lessons learned from this and other natural disasters, as well 
as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, suggest the need for emergency responders to expand 
responsibilities and become more networked and interactive with their peer disciplines to 
achieve higher levels of homeland security preparedness, prevention, and response 
capability (National Commission, 2005).  
In order to meet this challenge, federal, state, and local managers of homeland 
security will need to develop a strategy to build collaborative capacity within and across 
all emergency response disciplines (DHS, 2005). Until homeland security leaders 
accomplish this goal, America will continue to experience “the disaster that comes after a 
disaster,” as was witnessed in response to Hurricane Katrina (K. Cochran, personal 
communication).   
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At face value, most leaders would agree that collaboration positively impacts 
homeland security.  Some may even conclude that building a collaborative relationship 
with other agencies is an easy task. However, in their article “Building Collaborative 
Capacity: an Innovative Strategy for Homeland Security Preparedness,” Susan P. 
Hocevar and Gail F. Thomas argued that collaboration is extremely difficult (2004).  
Often there are deep-seated covert barriers and well-known overt barriers that are 
significant to individual organizations and impede relationships.  Their view is supported 
by the Office of the Director of National Security (ODNS).  While making great progress 
in efforts to reorganize and train for current and future challenges, the ODNS is 
nevertheless finding it difficult to integrate and align various aspects of the intelligence 
community. On every level, organizational cultures and competing budgets resist 
collaboration (Locher, 2008). 
Other obvious barriers include organizational and leadership issues, structural 
obstacles, conflicting goals and missions, competing incentives, narrow focus, lack of 
familiarity, and histories of distrust, as was the case between the New York Police 
Department (NYPD) and Fire Department of New York (FDNY). After action reports on 
the accounts of 9/11 revealed major gaps in communication, coordination, and 
collaboration within and among fire, police, and emergency medical agencies.  These 
same overt issues were identified as weaknesses during critiques of the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing.  Yet leaders of both departments failed to establish and 
implement policies and procedures identified as critical deficiencies following the 1993 
attack (National Commission, 2005, p. 567).  
Moreover, as early as 1996 interoperable radios were issued to key leaders in both 
organizations, but the system was never activated because chief officers could not agree 
on who would be in charge of the interagency frequency.  Consequently, when the attack 
of 9/11 occurred, first responders experienced the same communication challenges of the 
past primarily because these very same radios were in the fire chiefs’ trunks and on the 
police chiefs’ shelves (Hocevar & Thomas).   This incident is just one example of the 
long-standing tension and mistrust between these two departments (R. Blatus, personal 
communication).  
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According to Stephen Covey with Rebecca Merrill, in the book The Speed of 
Trust, when a person distrusts people, he or she is suspicious of that person and his or her 
integrity, agenda, track record, and abilities (2006, p. 5).  It is likely that in this case both 
the Police Chief (NYPD) and Fire Chief (FDNY) were operating in a “Distrust” zone of 
suspicion.  Based on the premise that life is filled with risk and risk taking is a part of 
life. In the “Smart Trust Matrix,” Covey claimed there is a combined factor of propensity 
to trust and analyze.  In varying combinations, this matrix includes four zones of trust. 
Zone 1 is the blind trust of everyone and Zone 2 is the “Smart Trust” zone of judgment.   
In Zone 2, the right combination of analysis and propensity to trust allow for good 
business and people judgment.   Conversely, Zone 3 is the no trust zone where people 
have low propensity and low analysis.  Finally, Zone 4 is the distrust or suspicious zone 
(Covey & Merrill, 2006, pp. 278-291).   
Firefighters and law enforcement leaders fit into the Zone 4 of the matrix.  They 
extend trust very cautiously or not at all to people outside of their discipline.  People in 
Zone 4 rely almost exclusively on analysis—mostly their own—for evaluation, decision 
making, and execution (Covery & Merrill, 2006, pp. 278-291). Unchecked by the 
authorizing power, this long-standing lack of trust between NYPD and FDNY has 
festered and built-up through years of tension and resentment (R. Blatus, personal 
communication).  
The lack of trust here is representative of the relationship between law 
enforcement and fire departments in other cities.  Competing for grants, jockeying for 
favor from elected officials, and competing for staffing and equipment resources are just 
a few contributors.  In addition to these outside influencers, the lack of trust is also 
cultural.  Recruits graduate the training academy with a one-sided understanding of the 
friction between agencies.   
Other not so obvious obstacles to collaboration include the lack of authorizing 
support, the lack of goal clarity, incompetence, distrust, and lack of active support from 
leadership.  A case in point is currently playing out in two metro Atlanta area counties.   
In both cases, disputes between the sheriff, who is an elected official, and the police  
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chief, appointed by a commission chair, are being aired on local television. Accusations 
include obstructing justice, withholding vital information, and not allowing access to 
respective facilities.   
These examples support the views of academic scholar Martin Linsky, a professor 
at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.   According to Linsky, the origin of 
disputes or issues between agencies can almost always be traced back to the leadership 
and/or authorizing authority.  Collaboration failed among emergency responders in the 
city of New York because it was not a priority among the powers that be.  Likewise, the 
county commissioners’ relationship and influence is currently affecting cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies in metro Atlanta. In both cases, had the authorizing 
authority taken a strong non-negotiable stance on the need to collaborate, clarified the 
city and/or county missions, and values, relationships may have improved between these 
organizations. 
Unfortunately, with the exception of recent grant requirements, there have not 
been many attempts to resolve this issue.  Perhaps the reason is the lack of importance 
placed on trust.  Many view trust and even collaboration as minor “warm and fuzzy” 
issues.  However, the author agrees with Stephen M. Covey; trust is not a soft issue.  
According to him, when the level of trust is changed between two organizations, the 
quality and value of service delivery is dramatically improved.  The author also agrees 
with Covey that trust can be created and improved.  To improve trust in these cases, the 
authorizing authority, in addition to department leaders, will need to accept and 
understand that trust can be leveraged as a strategic advantage to improve collaboration 
and enhance homeland security prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 
(Covery & Merrill, 2006, pp. 23-25).   
1. Bridges  
According to Jansen, Hocevar, and Thomas, the same organization design 
components—purpose and strategy, structure, lateral mechanisms, incentives, and 
people—could be either bridges or barriers to building partnerships (2004).  Success is 
the outcome when the following elements are realized: 
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• Acknowledge interdependency  
• Share goals 
• Sufficient authority and leadership support 
• Commitment  
• Effective communication and information sharing 
• Trust and appreciation   
Trust and collaboration are critical component of leadership.  To extend trust a 
leader must have strong characteristics such as integrity, intent, capabilities, and the 
ability to produce results.  Collaboration, which is built on trust, empowers people, 
leverages leadership, creates a high trust culture, and maximizes the ability to accomplish 
results (Covery & Merrill, 2006, pp. 23-25).  In this case, the end result would be a 
strategic plan for fire service in homeland security.  
According to Mark Gerzon in the book, Leading through Conflict: How 
Successful Leader Transform Differences into Opportunities, when one brings the right 
people together in constructive ways and give them reliable information, they will create 
authentic visions and strategies for addressing the shared concern. He quoted David 
Chrislip who described this successful fusion of people as the collaborative principle 
(2006, p. 50). What should successful collaboration or the collaborative principle in a 
non-emergency homeland security effort look like?   
The 2004 Group of Eight (G-8) Summit involved the successful, coordinated, and 
focused effort of 11,000 public safety officials from 136 agencies and the states of 
Georgia, South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida.  Planning, preparation, and prevention 
efforts were organized one year in advance by a Public Safety Command (PSC) steering 
committee appointed by the governor of Georgia.  Committee members consisted of 
executive level members of Secret Service, Georgia Office of Homeland Security, 
Georgia Emergency Management Agency (GEMA), Georgia Bureau of Investigations 
(GBI), Georgia State Patrol (GPS), Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), and the FBI. This 
committee successfully created and supported a collaborative structure consisting of 26 
sub-committees comprised of stake holders from state, federal, and local public safety 
agencies.   
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According to John M. Bryson in Strategic Planning for Pubic and Nonprofit 
Organizations, when trying to link different processes and functions of a large 
organization, an effective solution is to appoint heads of all the major players (Bryson, 
2004, p. 58).  Key decision makers get the information first hand, and in the case of the 
PSC steering committee, appoint sub-committees.  The PSC, acting as facilitators to the 
sub-committee, empower them with the appropriate responsibility and authority.  
Through a series of monthly and bi-monthly meetings, work sessions, and 
memorandums of understanding; teams, committees, liaisons, and task forces were 
created forming what Jansen, Hocevar, and Thomas describe as a formalized 
collaborative structure (2004). This successful collaborative initiative allowed all 
committees to make faster internal decisions, reduce cost through shared resources, and 
develop teams that are more productive. Two key factors contributed to the success of 
this collaborative effort: an Executive Order issued by the governor and coordination of 
operational planning (D. Burns, personal communication, May 22, 2007). 
2. Governor Executive Order 
The governor issued an executive order establishing a Public Safety Command 
(PSC) consisting of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security, GBI, GSP, DHR-PH, 
GEMA, and GANG.  His directive served as an external incentive for these five lead state 
agencies to coordinate and collaborate with one another and all outside agencies. As a 
result, conflicting protocols, missions, plans, and procedures were quickly revised and 
implemented.   Joint procedures and memorandums of understandings were established to 
address preparedness and prevention.  The effects of the order also eliminated structural 
barriers such as procedures, chain of command, and territorial conflicts.  Accordingly, the 
PSC and/or its sub-committees had the authority to dispatch any agent, officer, or 
responder anywhere in the state.   
While members of the PSC still had to establish ground rules and build trust and 
respect, an executive order from the governor directing state agencies to work as a team 
was a key factor to the success of this collaborative network effort (D. Burns, personal 
communication, May 22, 2007).   
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In contrast to the governor and his executive order, and the current National 
Security System, there is no mechanism in place that would allow the president to force 
implementations of the president’s decisions (Locher, 2008). In the case of the 
Department of Defense (DoD), it took an act of congress to make the military collaborate. 
3. Coordination of Operational Planning Efforts 
Another critical factor to the success of the G-8 was the fact that coordination and 
planning efforts started a year in advance.  The PCS met on a monthly basis to assess 
progress and to make sure that systems and processes were supportive of the sub-
committees.  For instance, in the case of first responders, many of the smaller 
departments did not have written mutual aid agreements or language in their City Charter 
to provide such arrangements.  Without this approval, they would not have been able to 
participate in the event.  There also was a need to obtain approval to dispatch fire 
equipment 150 plus miles outside of their respective cites.  Seeking this type of authority 
in the form of a resolution or ordinance change could take three to six months.  However, 
since these issues were identified early in the process, and since the requests were 
supported by the PCS and sub-committees, local elected officials were persuaded to act 
quickly (D. Burns, personal communication, May 22, 2007). 
4. Pros and Cons 
According to some, collaboration is on the rise in cooperate, military, and 
government organizations.  It has been found to reduce litigation, decrease costs, increase 
innovation, significantly reduce cycle time, allow cross sharing of best practices, and 
save millions of dollars.  In the case of homeland security, benefits to collaborative 
relationships also include an increase in situation awareness and prevention of terrorist 
acts, which directly impact injuries, property damage, and the loss of lives.   Moreover, 
when facing unconventional threats and major disasters, whether in the preparatory or 
response phrase, tasks interdependency as well as innovative and improvising decision 
making are critical goals that can only be accomplished by collaboration (Jansen, 
Hocevar, & Thomas, 2004). 
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On the other hand, collaboration can be stagnated based on the approach to 
building partnerships.  Contrary to the views of Jansen, Hocevar, and Thomas, Jeff Weiss 
and Jonathan Hughes, published in the in the Harvard Business Review, stated the quest 
for harmony and common goals can actually obstruct teamwork (2005).  If there is 
conflict between organizations, collaboration will not be successful until this issue is 
addressed.  Organization silos will continue to be a problem.  Therefore, leaders should 
first develop strategies for managing and resolving conflict (Weiss & Hughes, 2005).   
Although Weiss and Hughes’s article spoke to internal cooperation, based on the 
author’s experience, these same disadvantages apply to multi-agency group efforts 
(2005). The wrong approach to collaboration can create a “group think” environment  
During a meeting with city and county managers, fire, and law enforcement leaders of 
South Fulton County, the attendees were so determined to be cooperative that they failed 
to address fundamental issues that interfered with information sharing and emergency 
scene safety.   
5. Impact 
Forming effective partnerships will likely strengthen preparedness and prevention 
efforts, improve situation awareness, increase capabilities, and allow for seamless 
operations.  
6. Possible Political Fallout 
As was demonstrated in the G-8 Summit, building effective collaborative 
capacities requires political endorsement and participation from the top.  Depending on 
the political climate and the desired outcome there could be resistance from elected 
officials within and across local, state, and federal boundaries.  In metro Atlanta, unlike 
other areas in this country where consolidation is taking place, after years of lobbying 
and heated debates, portions of Fulton County have separated to form independent cities.   
Financial resources in the county have been greatly impacted. This heated climate could 





The G-8 Summit was a well-planned, very successful event that can be used as a 
model to develop an effective strategy to improve relationships and build collaborative 
capacity.  The strategy should include the following elements: 
• People – Include all stakeholders. Determine ground rules and procedures 
for managing and resolving conflicts. Disharmony in the preparedness 
phrase has its advantages. Be willing to agree to disagree. Respect and 
value differing opinions and skills and abilities of other members.  
• Purpose – Teams should have good knowledge of the core purpose, 
principals, mission and goals.  Additionally, members should understand 
and respect individual organizational missions, try to understand how they 
fit into organizational missions, and improve collaborative efforts to reach 
the desired outcome.   
• Authorizing Power – Elected officials on federal, state, and local levels 
will need to express a formal show of support for the collaborative effort.  
In turn, executive homeland security leaders should follow-up with over-
arching policies, procedures, and memorandums of understanding.   
Leaders should establish and support roles and responsibilities of all 
parties, as well as directives and orders from grant awards to collaborative 
initiatives meet the mission. 
• Social capital – Encourage interpersonal, interactive networks by 
organizing tiers of authority to share information and build trust, i.e.: top 
tier of elected officials meet quarterly, executives emergency response 
leaders meet monthly, and managers meet bi-monthly.   
• Incentives – Make collaboration between elected officials and first 
response agencies a prerequisite for funding and resources, discouraging 
competitive behaviors, and acknowledging contributions from all parties. 
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III. METHODOLOGY  
To determine the role of the fire service and identify emerging issues shaping its 
contribution to homeland security in the next five to ten years the author completed a 
series of informal interviews, structured and open-ended questions, and surveys of 
subject matter experts (SME) to generate ideas using the Delphi method.   
To develop a framework from which to draft the first round of questions for the 
Delphi members (DM), literature on emerging homeland security issues, leadership, 
intelligence collection, and national strategies and policies were reviewed.  In addition to 
using this information, the author used qualitative research by building questions from 
ground up.  Two separate groups of fire service leaders were interviewed including four 
fire chiefs (FC) and five current members of the NPS cohorts 701 and 702 (Cohorts). The 
FC members, identified confidentially as FC-A through D, were chosen because of their 
active involvement with the International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), community, 
and response discipline (see Appendix A, B, and C). 
Both groups were asked to discuss current, emerging, and future issues in 
homeland security specifically on leadership, collaboration, and intelligence opportunities 
as well as the fire service role in the National Strategies for Homeland Security. 
Feedback from both the FC and the Cohort groups provided the information needed to 
create a framework of three key categories from which a set of eight questions were 
developed to survey the Delphi members (DM). The first round of responses from Delphi 
members were analyzed and synthesized.  They revealed four topics as key issues to 
future homeland security needs.  These three of the essential topics were further 
developed into a second round of twelve questions.  Responses to these questions are 
followed by conclusions and recommendations based on feedback from the DM and the 
other two participants. 
The author used open coding to develop a set of emerging concepts relating to 
future homeland security issues in the fire service.  Based on quotes taken from the FC 
interview transcripts, first order codes that were grounded in the language of the 
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interviewees were generated.  From these first order codes, the author generated second 
order codes or concepts (conscripts).  Appendix D illustrates the open coding process in 
the Fire Chief (FC) interviews.  Phase One responses from the DM were examined and 
arranged in like manner.  First order and second order codes are reflected in Appendix E.  
These responses generated additional interesting ideas captured in the second round of 
DM questions.  First order and second order coding for Phase Two of the DM is reflected 
in Appendix F.       
A. PHASE ONE – ANALYSIS OF DATA 
1. Fire Chief Group (FC) 
In discussions about the role of the fire service in homeland security, core 
mission, traditional mission, critical mission, and new mission were terms used by all 
four chiefs to define where the fire department fit in the homeland security/all hazard 
matrix.  One chief (FC-A) stated that the original mission, in its simplest terms, says it 
all.  He explained that fire service leaders should expand the mission to include all hazard 
mitigation only for the benefit of the stakeholders.  Otherwise, he believes homeland 
security is merely an extension of the original mission.  While three FCs claimed the fire 
service should focus on strategies to address any major disaster, regardless of whether it 
is intentional, accidental, or an act of nature, responses from two of these members (B 
and D) indicate their belief that the mission has changed. One of these chiefs (FC-B) had 
an interesting comment; he felt fire service leaders should consider the organization a 
homeland security agency that occasionally goes to fires as opposed to a fire rescue 
department that occasionally respond to homeland security incidents.  Still another fire 
chief (FC-D) expressed the need to create and fund homeland security positions in fusion 
centers, and to develop a Homeland Security Oversight Committee.  Even though three 
chiefs expressed the need for all hazard, some of their responses also indicated that they 
recognized the need for a specific homeland security focus. 
Other indications of change to the traditional mission of the fire department 
appeared in three of the fire chief’s (FC-B, C, D) recommendations to engage in 
intelligence information sharing; expand the fire service role to include prevention, 
 41
collection, and detection; and the need to provide homeland security and intelligence 
training.  These three chiefs also had similar recommendations on how to prepare for an 
expanded role in homeland security: train/cross train, plan mock terrorist and mass 
casualty drills, develop subject matter experts, provide proper CBRNE equipment, and 
network with other agencies.   
All participants expressed concerns about the need to build collaboration, 
relationships, and partnerships.  All agreed that the lack of effective collaboration has a 
major impact on homeland security.  One member stated that as a culture, the fire service 
isolates from other agencies, including elected officials.  He theorized that if members 
connect with the people who pay them then members would receive recognition.  His was 
an interesting comment on isolations that might offer some insight into why the fire 
service is often not included in homeland security initiatives.  This same member (FC-B) 
declared that the fire service’s greatest challenge to collaboration and integration is its 
closed culture, a culture of self-reliance.  He supposed that members are afraid of 
rejection and loss of hero status.  He said that in order to have a relationship, one must be 
vulnerable.  It would be interesting to see this theory further developed.  Another 
comment about collaboration came from a different chief who declared relationship 
barriers do not exist on the leadership level but among the rank and file members of fire 
and law enforcement.  This comment is disputed in the literature review, in the 
Leadership/Collaboration Chapter, and it was unsubstantiated by other participants in the 
process. 
Additional issues articulated by three fire chiefs included: (1) concerns about the 
fire service’s lack of inclusion in homeland security, and (2) the need to interface and 
learn from international counterparts in Israel, France, and the United Kingdom (UK).   
Citizens and homeland security leaders in these countries have had decades of experience 
in preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery of terrorist attacks.  As one chief 
observed, it is a lifestyle for them, and Americans could learn a lot, from not only the 
leaders, but the citizens as well.  This observation rang true for other members, including 
members of the Cohort and DM groups.   
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Involvement in all aspects of homeland security in essence would be a life style 
change for fire fighters.  As FC-D described, the fire service should play an active role in 
transportation and border security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting critical 
infrastructure as well as emergency preparedness and response. The key is involvement 
and FC-D thought the fire department could be grouped in all of the pillars of homeland 
security.  He acknowledged that to make these shifts in service a change in the mind set 
of firefighters and leaders in the industry would be required. 
The need for standardized training and/or education among career and volunteer 
firefighters, in some form or another, was mentioned by two FC members.  It was 
considered a top priority with one fire chief, and another felt that cross certifications 
among law enforcement and fire members would increase situation awareness and 
encourage collaboration.  One chief (FC-A) expressed that the IAFC’s National Mutual 
Aid System has federalized the fire department by virtue of its plan to connect intrastate 
and interstate mutual aid.  However, concerns expressed about standardized training and 
federal mandates indicate that other participants either have no knowledge of this or did 
not view national mutual aid as a system that could work on a federal level.  For instance, 
two FC members, all five Cohorts, and members of the Delphi group felt firefighters 
were not trained in a consistent manner.  This being the case, while departments across 
state lines may respond to an incident, performance and capabilities are likely to be 
ineffective because of the lack of standardized training. Two fire chiefs expressed 
concerns about firefighter safety and one of these voiced concerns for the need to secure 
apparatuses and equipment.  Currently, fire trucks do not have lockable ignitions, or even 
in most cases, lockable doors.   Anyone can gain access to the truck and start it up by 
turning the master switch and pushing the ignition button.   
2. Fire Chief (FC) Analysis 
Members of the fire chief group were conflicted in their view of whether the 
industry is working within the existing mission or if the mission has changed since the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11.  They all agreed that if the fire department focused on all hazard 
response mitigation then terrorist attacks and homeland security would be included.  The 
premise is if first responders are prepared for all hazards they will be able to effectively 
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mitigate disastrous incidents that are accidental, acts of nature, or intentional acts of 
terrorism. However, this somewhat conflicts with the belief some expressed about the 
need to budget and staff a homeland security section, committee, or representative.  FC 
members agreed there is a definite need to be included in the national strategies whether 
represented by the IAFC or the National Fire Administration.  There was also a 
consensus on providing training and preparing firefighters to engage in prevention, 
intelligence collection, and information sharing.  Recognizing the need to staff a 
homeland security representative, to engage in training, and to have a presence in 
national strategies are indications that the mission is more than all hazards.        
The most passionate responses were expressed about the culture, tradition, and 
mindset of the fire service.  They all agreed that conventional practices prevent progress 
and hinder homeland security.  However, none of the four participants mentioned the role 
leadership plays in the problem and/or solution.   Yet, unquestionably, leadership must 
play a role in mission shifts and change management.   Finding ways to maneuver 
through these barriers will result in positive, proficient, and collaborative partnerships. 
3. Cohorts 701 and 702    
In a separate setting, at the Naval Postgraduate School, the author met informally 
with five members of the fire department currently enrolled in Cohorts 701 and 702 
(Cohorts). Attendees were asked to share their views on the fire department’s future role 
in homeland security.  Several points were discussed.    Contrary to the concerns of the 
FC group, where only one member mentioned funding, all five cohort participants 
emphasized the lack of adequate staffing and funding as a current and future issues 
impacting homeland security. Perhaps the four fire chiefs were accustomed to navigating 
solutions with limited resources.  In any case, funding and lack of resources have been 
issues in the fire service for at least the past twenty-eight years and will continue to be a 
habitual concern in the future.1  Moreover, in the public safety network the lack of 
funding must not dictate strategic planning to meet future expectations.  As one member 
of the FC group (FC-D) stated, “…we must budget accordingly…government grants will 
                                                 
1 This is based on author’s 28 years of experience in the fire service. 
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not subsidize this function indefinitely.”  While funding and resource issues are 
extremely important, they are not considered extraordinary or specific to future homeland 
security concerns in the fire service.  Therefore, they will not be addressed in this thesis.   
In the process of analyzing this data, the author’s department was reduced by 48 
percent, which resulted in the closure of two of five fire stations and the layoff of forty-
eight firefighters.  In response to this massive budget cut, a member from the fire chief 
group (FC-A) declared that fire members must not rush to help a department that has 
been cut to this degree, lest they experience the same.  He went on to point out that the 
fire service has a tradition of “making do” and delivering quality service with very little 
resources.  He felt this issue could grow to become a serious threat to all hazard and 
homeland security capabilities.  His comments prompted the author to reexamine all 
remarks.   A second and third review of both FC-4 and Cohorts’ comments revealed that 
lack of funding was a considerable concern for all Cohorts but only slightly touched upon 
by one of the FCs.   However, increased financial deficits, diminishing public safety 
budgets, and the growing threat of public safety layoffs could become capability issues; 
this, supported DM-1’s suggestion to shift focus to a strategy designed to leverage the 
community and private businesses. 
In addition to voicing budgetary concerns, all five members of the Cohort group 
were concerned about the fire service’s lack of inclusion in homeland security strategies 
and the need to make standardized training and national standards funded mandates 
instead of suggestions.  Four of the five advocated that national standardized homeland 
security detection, prevention, and preparedness training should be provided and required 
for firefighters.  Not all agreed on the role firefighters should assume once this training is 
complete.  All affirmed that barriers to collaboration, interoperability, and information 
sharing does and will continue to negatively impact homeland security.  
Analysis of responses from both the FC and Cohorts groups revealed four 
prevailing themes that stood out and generated more discussion than others: 
• Lack of inclusion in national strategies 
• Expanding the role of the fire service to include collection and sharing of 
intelligence information 
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• Need for progressive leadership  
• Improved collaboration   
The lack of inclusion in national strategies and in state, regional, and federal 
planning was a major concern in both the FC and Cohorts groups.  Three of the five 
Cohorts members declared that the fire service must expand its role to include the 
prevention and detection of terrorist activities or risk losing its tenuous position in 
homeland security.  
One member had not decided whether to support or oppose involving firefighters 
in this manner.  This Cohort’s main concern was protecting the rights of citizens in need 
of help from the fire service.  This member could only support the idea of using 
firefighters as collectors if strong guidelines and standard operating procedures were in 
place first with a system to monitor for abuse.  Amazingly, there were few others to voice 
concerns about privacy rights and the loss of trust.  Another Cohort member vehemently 
objected to the prospect of using firefighters in this capacity.  This participant thought the 
focus should be on improving response and recovery instead of participating in any of the 
other pillars of homeland security.  All but one member of the FC group articulated the 
need to expand homeland security duties in the fire department.   
Another issue that surfaced was the need for progressive leadership.  All Cohorts 
members believed there is a lack of understanding of national homeland security 
strategies among some fire service leaders.  They also agreed barriers to collaboration 
and interoperability are exacerbated by leaders across all first responder disciplines. They 
acknowledged that these issues are not likely to be resolved without directions from 
across agency leadership. Responses from the Cohorts group in this category were 
interesting because although each of the FC members also expressed concerns about 
collaboration, interoperability, and communication, none of them viewed these as 
leadership induced or exacerbated.  It would be interesting to see a researcher explore 
how fire chiefs view their roles in collaboration, integration and leadership.  Although 
none of the FC members expressed concerns about leadership, the Cohort group and the 
author believes leadership applies to every aspect of concerns expressed, and therefore it 
has been included as a topic in the Delphi study.  
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4. Cohort Group Analysis  
The need for progressive leadership generated a greater degree of consensus and 
resonated more passionately with the Cohorts group than that of the FC.  Members 
claimed that the lack of effective leadership across disciplines prevents collaboration 
among first responders.  All members of the Cohorts group believe the fire service should 
be included in national strategies, as well as state, regional, and federal level fusion 
centers.  However, the Cohorts also said there is a lack of understanding concerning 
national homeland security strategies among some fire service leaders.  The inference is 
that this lack of understanding among leaders could be hindering effective collaboration 
and preventing the fire service inclusion in national homeland security strategies.   This 
interpretation is likely influenced by Cohorts members’ exposure to educational programs 
designed to stimulate strategic thinking. 
Standardized mandated training was recognized across the board as being an 
emerging issue as well as a current problem.  Like the FC group, the Cohorts recognized 
that resources for all hazard mitigation will depend on members from varied departments, 
agencies, and jurisdictions.  This means that different fire departments will be required to 
work together. To make a seamless operation, joint training, and cross training is needed.  
There were conflicts concerning whether the fire service role should be expanded or 
current response capabilities enhanced.   Concern for privacy was not a major issue for 
four of the five respondents. 
5. Delphi Members (DM 1-6) 
Feedback from both the FC and the Cohorts groups provided the information 
needed to create a framework of three key categories that referenced the future role of the 
fire service in homeland security strategies.  Open-ended questions were created and 
grouped using the following categories:  
• Emerging issues facing the fire service 
• Leadership/collaboration/partnership challenges 
• Expand fire service current role in the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (NSHS)   
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A total of eight open ended questions were developed from this broad outline of 
three topics.  They were sent to a new group of six fire service leaders, referred to as 
Delphi Members (DM).  DM group members were selected from a list of Naval 
Postgraduate School alumni members with fire service backgrounds and because of their 
experience and familiarity with homeland security strategies.   Each member is a graduate 
of the Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s Master’s Degree Program. 
6. Emerging Issues 
The DM group was asked to identify emerging issues that are shaping future 
homeland security efforts in the fire service.  Mirroring the FC group, they expressed 
concerns about the lack of clarity in the role and mission of the fire service and all 
hazards verses homeland security.  They also identified the following as emerging 
concerns: lack of inclusion in national strategies, reductions in funds, budgetary 
constraints, having to compete for funds, apathy for the homeland security mission, lack 
of effective collaboration, the need for progressive leadership, reactive verses proactive 
service delivery, education and training, engaging the community, response capability, 
the need for information sharing, the need for planning, and a focus on intelligence 
collection.  These issues are parallel to the ones raised by the FC and Cohorts groups.    
Just as was mentioned with previous group members, lack of funds and budgetary 
constraints were listed as key issues among some Delphi participants.   DM-3 declared 
that local government, initially blinded by available grant funds, has focused solely on 
the purchase of equipment to support response and recovery and will not be able to fund 
long-term maintenance of those items.  Moreover, prevention, deterrence, and preparation 
are becoming lost in the shadows of increasing response capabilities.  Indications here 
suggest that supporting homeland security and national strategies were perceived as 
secondary to concerns of response and equipment. DM-1 predicted that absent another 
attack apathy for the homeland security mission would result in dramatic reductions in 
funds.  DM-2 deemed competition for grant funds and tax levy budgetary funds will get 
tighter in the near future.  He suggested the fire service increase its grant writing skills or 
hire outside professionals.  However, an increasing need to compete for grant funds could 
create additional barriers to collaboration and trust among first response agencies.  
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Considering this and the recommendations concerning the need to fund specific 
homeland security staff and training made by several members from each group, the need 
to overcome or manage within budgetary constraints becomes an evermore pressing 
matter. 
The lack of inclusion of the fire service as partners in national strategies for 
homeland security was another issue that was almost unanimous among all three groups.  
In addition to response and recovery, all members of the Cohorts and Delphi groups and 
three members of the FC group, argued that the fire department should be included in 
preparedness, prevention, detection, and information sharing initiatives.  However, they 
did not all agree on how this should happen or who should make it happen.   
Some Delphi Members strongly suggested the solution lies outside of the fire 
department.  DM-2 stated the hierarchy fire service and jurisdictional administrators must 
decide how extensively they will allow fire departments to participate in homeland 
security.  Others argued that the fire service vision is not clear, even almost seven years 
after 9/11, and implied this may be the reason for being the exclusion of the fire service..  
DM-3’s observation may offer some insight as to why the vision is unclear.  She 
suggested that local fire service leaders will need to gain a clear understanding of the 
critical missions defined by the federal government.  This is a very interesting comment  
that raised several questions: If local fire service leaders do not have a clear 
understanding of national homeland security strategies, would including the fire service 
as partners in all of the pillars of the mission make any difference?  What will it take and 
who shall be responsible, for reaching, teaching, and convincing these local leaders of the 
importance of their involvement in the national strategies? 
This brought up the issue of mission again and whether leaders believe that it has 
changed or remains the same. There were some conflicts in the discussion of whether the 
mission has changed or if the fire service’s role in homeland security an adaptation of the 
original mission. FC-A claimed the mission is essentially the same and was supported by 
DM-6, who maintained that engaging in prevention or intelligence activities would be an 
adaptation of the current mission as opposed to an expansion of the fire service role. He 
pointed out that adaptation is not expansion.  He explained that the fire department has 
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already expanded their role to include emergency medical, fire prevention, heavy rescue, 
and hazardous material mitigation.  The fire service already has significant role in 
homeland security, which they need to continue to fill while adapting to demands of 
terrorist threats.  His assessment was on the mark in the sense that adaptation is a 
constantly evolving and unlimited process that is defined by current and future 
circumstances or demands.   This is certainly a posture that would allow the fire service 
to adjust to current and future trends and threats.  At any rate, the issue of whether the 
future role of the fire service involves an adaptation of current service delivery or an 
expansion that would include prevention and detection of terrorist acts can be summed up 
in this quote by FC-B from the fire chief group, “Fire suppression is not a growing 
industry.”    
Uncertainty and lack of mission clarity or understanding could impact homeland 
security efforts.  Once again, it could also cause the fire service to be left out of homeland 
security strategies.  For instance, if a leader believes the mission to be the same then that 
leader may not see a need to become educated on national homeland security missions.  
The need for local fire service agencies to have a clear understanding of critical mission 
as defined by the national strategies is an emerging issue that is also connected to the 
need to include the fire service in these strategies.   
Another matter that may be contributing to lack of inclusion of the fire service in 
national strategies could be, as DM-1 suggested, the fact that the industry does not have a 
single voice or organization that represents the American fire service as a whole. There 
are 30,000 fire departments that are similar to one another in some ways but are vastly 
different in service delivery.  DM-1 considered this a fundamental impediment to 
building effective relationships.   
Response and recovery concerns expressed by the DMs and other participants 
included preparedness, adequate training, adequate resources to respond to improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), the need for adequate staffing, the ability to evacuate large 
cities, terrorism, and the need to leverage citizens and businesses in the community.   
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7. Expanding Role  
DMs were asked to discuss if the fire industry should expand its current role in 
homeland security to support the other pillars of homeland security including prevention, 
and protection as well as response and recovery.  An overwhelming majority of DM 
participants, as well as other participants, agreed the fire service should include 
prevention in their homeland security efforts.  However, not all agreed on how this 
should be done.  Responses included the need to collect intelligence information while on 
routine inspections and responses; to assume an intelligence role and be represented in 
fusion centers; to be fully integrated into the intelligence cycle but take no part in 
collection or receiving of intelligence information; and for the intelligence community to 
share information with the fire service.  These varying views on the fire service role in 
prevention support the idea of adaptation, which allows for fluid changes.  
One DM argued that the fire service would fail in its mission to provide public 
safety if it does not shift focus from tactical planning to a strategy designed to leverage 
the community and engage in intelligence. He said this would allow the fire industry to 
maximize its efficiency and effectiveness.  In view of increasing financial constraints, 
and overwhelmed response capabilities, leveraging the community and businesses is a 
key strategy.   
Another member (DM-4) supported the idea of involving firefighters in 
prevention through intelligence collection.  He expressed the need to become more 
proactive as opposed to reactive; he explained response and recovery by nature is 
reactive.  Since firefighters have access to areas normally restricted to other agencies, 
engaging in collecting intelligence information would be proactive. 
DM-2 agreed stating that the fire service will need to choose whether to retreat 
back into the firehouse and remain a reactive workforce or become proactive and 
engaging.  Proactive leaders will need to decide whether or how extensively they would 
like to take on the challenge of homeland security as it relates to community engagement, 
intelligence, protection, and prevention. DM-2 had the same views as DM-4.  He 
advocated that fusion centers and intelligence roles are a natural avenue through which 
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mid-level managers in the fire service can contribute. In many states, fire and emergency 
medical disciplines are not included in fusion centers.   
DM-5 held a similar opinion.  He declared this expansion should include tapping 
into the ability to collect information, networking with other disciplines and fire 
departments across the country, and gaining more awareness of precursors of terrorism 
through intelligence. DM-3 paralleled this idea and went on to express the need to fuse 
law enforcement and intelligence professionals with fire personnel together on task forces 
and joint terrorism initiatives.   
On the other hand, DM-1 asserted that the fire service should ever be tasked with 
terrorism prevention.  Like Cohort 5, he maintained the fire service should focus on doing 
what it does- protection, response, recovery, and endurance- better.  Both these 
participants called for the need to broaden response capacity by providing adequate 
training, equipment, personnel, protective equipment, and expanding capabilities.  
Specialized teams cannot always be relied upon.  Therefore, the fire service must look to 
build capacity by training its own members.  He pointed out that there are a number of 
special hazard courses available to the fire department.  Leaders should adjust to the new 
threat environment by training, equipping, and allowing first responders to do more – that 
is with response, not collection.  However, he thought that in order to maximize 
efficiency and effectiveness and to provide the greatest protection the fire service must 
recognize the advantage of participating in tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence 
and information sharing.  While these are legitimate needs, other participants do not view 
them as mutually exclusive to intelligence, detection, or information sharing.   
A third member, DM-6, declared the fire service should be expanded.   However, 
he agreed one of the issues facing the fire industry is deciding whether it should “fuse” 
with the intelligence service and decide what the requirements for the fire service should 
be just as law enforcement has decided.  He was convinced that the fire service should be 




Delphi Members were asked to identify strategies that fire service leaders could 
develop to manage leadership, organizational, and collaboration challenges to future 
homeland security needs.  In every category, emerging issues, expanding the role of fire 
service, and barriers to collaboration, members in the DM group recognized that fire 
service leaders must take the helm: Leaders must demand a seat at the homeland security 
and intelligence table (DM-6).  DM-1 articulated that leaders should lobby (as opposed to 
demand) national legislators to be included in public policy documents and strategies. In 
order to do so they will need to gain a clear understanding of the critical missions 
identified in national strategies (DM-3).  They must clearly communicate their agency’s 
homeland security mission to all levels of personnel.  They must be willing to take risks 
and embrace new concepts.  DM-1 suggested that on a federal level the fire service will 
need to find a way to coalesce around a common vision of what role the fire service 
wishes to take in homeland security.   
Other responses were also consistent in recommendations for the need to address 
collaboration and cultural barriers, education, training; and the need to develop members 
in lower ranks in order to prepare them for promotions and to include them in decision 
processes.  DM members also identified the following strategies for leaders to develop: 
the need to provide training for supervisors, empower middle managers, get outside of 
the fire department mindset, engage in strategic programs such as the one offered by 
NPS, and create a homeland security structure Strategic leadership, education, and 
collaboration were prevailing issues in their responses.  
9. Strategic Leadership   
Several members emphasized the need for leaders to sharpen and build strategic 
thinking skills for themselves and management staff.  They expressed the need for the 
fire department to embrace homeland security needs from a strategic rather than tactical 
level.  DM-5 explained that leaders could do this by getting outside of the fire mindset, 
forging into the world, and participating in educational programs like the one NPS offers 
and thus be introduced to other points of view.   DM-1 went further and said leaders need 
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to begin working more at the macro-level and step outside of their own political 
boundaries.  This need was also identified by FC-C and FC-D of the fire chiefs group.  
FC-C acknowledged the need to expose staff to forums discussing perspectives in 
homeland security on a national and international level.  And FC-D recommends 
developing a Homeland Security Oversight Committee to evaluate key strategies and 
provide leadership training to management.  DM-2 endorsed a program the FDNY has 
developed.  The course offers training and educational modules designed to teach every 
level of supervisor decision making strategies.  All of these suggestions described the 
need for adaptive change. 
10. Education/Training    
All of the participants considered the need for formal education, networking, 
and/or training within and across disciplines as an emerging issue.  DM-2 recommended 
the development of internal training programs and the use of external opportunities 
offered by DHS and other federal and state agencies.   His observation that supervisors 
should receive courses designed to move them away from tactical decision making to 
strategic thinking was a key point that is indirectly echoed by other members.  DM-4 
hesitantly concurred with this assessment.  Starting out by saying “as much as I hate to 
admit this,” he agreed that the fire service needs to re-direct training from response and 
recovery to proactive prevention strategies and become less reactive.  Participants from 
all three groups viewed standardized training as a current issue that will increasingly 
become a challenge in the next five to ten years.  
Recommendations for standardized training in homeland security prevention and 
preparedness as well as terrorist detection, awareness, and intelligence were not 
surprising.  These were a constant across all participants’ responses.  Based on responses, 
it is apparent that the need to recognize terrorist threats, maximize effectiveness, improve 
planning skills, communications, and collaboration among and between a host of 
disciplines is becoming more and more important to national homeland security missions.  
For example, as part of the planning process, DM-2 stated the fire service must allocate 
and budget for necessary training for personnel in order to maintain capability in specific 
areas.  
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The need to decentralize the structure and leadership in career/paid fire 
departments surfaced as an interesting idea.  Although only three DM specifically 
identified decentralization as a future need, several expressed the same concerns by using 
different descriptions.  For example, some of the descriptions included the needs: for a 
bottom-up approach; to allow mid-managers more flexibility, to allow participation in 
homeland security based not on rank but knowledge, to think outside the box, to cross 
pollinate, to flatten the organization structure, and the need for leaders to get out of the 
way.  One member also felt that there are too many managers and not enough leaders. 
This statement also inferred the need to change the current organizational structure as 
well as the leadership approach.   
11. Collaboration 
The lack of information sharing, once again is an issue of concern expressed by 
all participants.  Although law enforcement and the fire service work together regularly, 
one member (DM-1) claimed cultural differences limit information sharing and true 
collaboration.  By pointing out that this barrier is more prevalent in law enforcement he 
gave and interesting example.  DM-1 explained that although there are claims that 
information cannot be shared, he has never found a legal basis for that claim- not in the 
privacy act of 1984, the Freedom of Information Act, Title 18 of the U.Ss Code, nor 
under Title 28 of the U.S. Code. It is an issue of law enforcement culture.  This writer and 
other members have always assumed reluctance to share information with the fire 
department was governed by state or federal statutes.  But as DM-6 later pointed out, if 
firefighters must be certified in order to receive intelligence information, how is it that 
policy makers qualify to receive this information? 
On the other hand, FC-B observed that the closed culture of the fire department is 
also one of the biggest challenges.  As the two primary agencies tasked with homeland 
security missions at the local level, both fire and law need to set aside traditional barriers 
and work cooperatively.  He and several other members named tradition, culture, and the 
lack of collaboration as barriers preventing homeland security.  The issue of cultural 
barriers inhibiting collaboration and thus homeland security is not likely to be resolved 
on its own.  Some participants argued, and this author agrees, that breaking down these 
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barriers must be done at the chief’s level and higher. Strong leadership from the city 
manager or mayor in conjunction with lead organizations such as the IACP, IAFC, and 
ICMA need to take up the issue of public safety agency information sharing and 
collaboration and move it center stage.    One again, what is most interesting is that the 
fire chiefs in the FC group did not mention leadership as a barrier to collaboration. 
Not surprising is the fact that all six DMs advocated the need to leverage and 
build collaborative relationships with public/private and other first responders is 
imperative to meeting future homeland security needs.  In both formal and informal 
queries, all NPS respondents expressed the need to address collaborative issues.  Perhaps, 
as many participants have indicated, strategic educational programs such as the NPS 
program allow them a different perspective.  Another interesting point was made by two 
members who listed private security, taxi drivers, and the metro rapid transit authority as 
agencies the fire service needs to partner with.  These three partners would join 
traditional first responders such as public utilities, public works, emergency medical, and 
public health agencies in preventive efforts.  
After analyzing and synthesizing the first round of DM responses in like 
categories, four topics emerged as key patterns: 
• Response capabilities  
• Intelligence  
• Leadership    
• Collaboration 
Concerns about the ability to respond and manage large scale emergencies are 
huge issues in all first responder disciplines.  As such, of the four topics above response 
capabilities are not discussed because they warrant attention beyond the undertaking of 
this thesis.   
In regards to intelligence, leadership, and collaboration, the opinions expressed on 
these subjects by DM participants in the first round of questions generated additional 
interesting ideas and considerations.  For instance, could leadership in the fire service be 
hindering its role in homeland security; should the fire service participate in intelligence 
collection; and would cross training and assigning duties improve collaboration?  Do 
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these responses suggest significant systemic issues that could affect the future role of the 
fire service in homeland security?  A second round of questions for the DM members was 
generated to find these and other answers.   
B. PHASE TWO – ANALYSIS OF DATA 
In this second and final phase of the survey, twelve questions were developed 
based on the three key categories of intelligence, leadership, and collaboration.  Issues 
and recommendation expressed in the first phase were used to formulate sub-questions 
designed to further identify essential concerns and to offer solutions, conclusions or 
recommendations to the effects these key categories will have on future homeland 
security efforts.  Reactions and recommendations were quite similar.  However, one of 
the questions was vague or misleading and therefore did not generate the responses 
sought.  The question of whether the fire service should be decentralized was meant to 
discern whether centralized organizational structures in paid departments should be 
flattened.   The author did not make this clear so some participants responded based on 
the assumption that the question referred to both paid and volunteer firefighters.  For 
instance, DM-6 responded that with 30,000 fire departments and only a quarter were 
paid; the fire service is one of the most decentralized professions in the U.S.  
Nevertheless, these responses were fruitful. 
1. Intelligence 
DM group members were asked the following questions associated with 
intelligence: 
• If there is an intelligence role for the fire service what would it look like? 
• If the fire service played a role in the collection of terrorist information, 
how would this affect the privacy rights of citizens? 
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a. How Could Intelligence Information be Shared with the Fire 
Department? What Would Intelligence Look Like? 
An intelligence role for the fire service should include the participation of 
a fire representative in joint task forces and fusion centers.  In urban areas and others 
where there is a valid threat, DM-1 declared that at least one person from the fire service 
should be designated to the fusion center.  This person would monitor the current threat 
environment, do analysis on trends, liaison with law enforcement, and collaborate with 
other fire departments.  
DM-3 echoed this assessment in her belief that giving information on 
trends and tactics to first responders will improve response capabilities. She supported 
the idea of a member from the fire service having a seat at the table.  DM-2 declared the 
fire service’s primary role in the community would allow them to act as sensors and 
gather significant information while they respond, educate, inspect, and train the public.   
One member (DM-5) expressed the belief that the ability to discover suspicious activities 
and define changes in conditions would be the result of engaging the fire service in an 
intelligence role.   
While DM-6 agreed that the fire service should be integrated into the 
intelligence cycle as sensors, and he made a valid point when he suggested the 
intelligence community needs to adapt their culture to allow these non-traditional 
participants. Since this will require proactive change from the intelligence community 
(IC), his statement illustrated the need for legislative authority to regulate the IC in 
information sharing and inclusion.  Just as the fire department and law enforcement 
culture inhibit homeland security initiatives, so is the case with the intelligence 
community. DM-6 went on to say that although there is great value in firefighters as 
sensors forming networks distributed through out the nation, it is more important for 
firefighters to be considered homeland security leaders deserving to be served by the 
intelligence community. 
All respondents agreed on the value of intelligence in the fire service in 
both receiving and dispensing information. Some pointed out that the value of 
intelligence on the receiving end is that it could be used to direct operational strategy, 
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drive the budget, staffing, planning, and training.  Another member raised a most crucial 
point; receiving intelligence information in a timely manner would protect firefighters 
and improve safety.  
b. Privacy Rights of Citizens? 
All Delphi Members and other participants agreed that access into the 
private homes of the public and inspections of business facilities offer the opportunity for 
firefighters to detect suspicious behaviors and precursors to terrorist acts.  However, 
concerns for the invasion of privacy and the loss of trust are issues some suggested would 
manifest as a result of using these first responders as intelligence sensors. DM-1 asserted 
that using firefighters as collectors of intelligence information would conflict with 
privacy.  He stated firefighters are bound by law to protect and safeguard sensitive 
information (HIPPA or SARA Title 3).  They already have experience in managing 
confidential information through emergency medical service, fire suppression, and fire 
safety inspections. DM-2 agreed that firefighters could be used as collectors of 
information within the realms of the law.  This information should be funneled through 
screeners and solid information passed to the IC.   But DM-2 failed to identify who 
would screen this information. This raises the issue of the IC becoming overwhelmed 
with too much information and inadequate means of analysis.   
The need to be clear and offer precise definitions to words like terrorist 
information, collectors, and sensors was made apparent by responses from DM-5 and 
DM-3.   DM-5 pointed out that terrorist activities, privacy policies, and information 
should be transparent and clearly defined.   Other responses were distorted.   For 
example, although DM-3 was not convinced that firefighters should be used as collectors, 
she acknowledged they are in a unique position to collect information and they have an 
obligation to recognize and report criminal activity to the proper authority.  Her 
description matched the author’s definition of intelligence collection.  Even though she 
was not convinced, this portion of her response will be considered a positive endorsement 
with reservations.   
Another Delphi Member (DM-6) responded that there are legal precedents 
and community standards to support firefighters as sensors, not collectors.  He joined 
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DM-1 and DM-2 in the view of what is required by law.  Knowledge of domestic 
violence and child abuse must be reported.  Even in the strictest circumstances of 
confidentiality such as between attorney/client and doctor/patient have reasonable limits.  
Likewise, he affirmed that firefighters have an obligation to report this and other crimes 
or suspicions of criminal activity.   
Unlike DMs 1 and 2, DM-3 expressed major concerns about 
compromising the public’s privacy and trust.  She argued the fire service would need 
strict enforcement of laws, rules, and standard operating procedures along with extensive 
training to become collectors of intelligence information.  Her view was congruent to 
another Cohort.  DM-1 did see a problem with the 4th Amendment rights if firefighters 
elected to search beyond what is readily available at the open site.   This concern was 
echoed by DM-6 when he emphasized the point that firefighters do not investigate but 
report crimes that shock the community.  DM-1 joined several others in recognizing the 
need to have clear, concise procedures and significant training.   
c. How Could Intelligence Information be Shared with the Fire 
Department? 
All agreed intelligence information should be shared with fire departments 
in a similar manner as it is shared with law enforcement (LA) - from the top down from 
leaders and commanders with adequate clearance.  The discussion on clearance once 
again surfaced.  As appropriately pointed out by DM -6, if there was a requirement to be 
a sworn law enforcement officer before receiving classified information, then policy 
makers and homeland security leaders outside of law enforcement would not be privy to 
intelligence.  An interesting fact surfaced as a result of this.  Several DMs pointed out 
that they could find no statutes or laws, including Title 18 and Title 28 of the U.S. Codes 
that precluded LA from sharing information with the fire department.  This long believed 
justification, according to DM-1 and DM-6, has more to do with culture than law.  
Although fire and law enforcement have different roles, DM-6 claimed the 
IC must accept its obligation to serve a greater community than just LA.  He stated 
unclassified information should be shared with all fire service members and classified 
information only with those properly cleared and vetted command.  DM-1 also stipulated 
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that individuals should be vetted.  He described the need for a sophisticated interactive 
information network that is accessible to all public safety agencies nationwide.  
Individuals would be vetted for access with multi-tiered security clearances.  This 
sounded like an effective way to distribute information.  It could be used, as DM-5 
recommended, to distribute threat alerts, sector specific reports (HITAC), and situational 
awareness.  However, while DM-3 agreed that technology can be used as a means to 
share information, she made a valid point.  The collectors of information, assuming they 
are from another discipline, may not understand that which is pertinent to the fire service.  
She joined other Delphi Members in her concern that the fire department should have a 
designated place in fusion centers, with the IC, and in homeland security planning. 
2. Leadership 
Delphi members were asked the following questions to generate dialogue on 
leadership:   
• What are the leadership issues around homeland security? 
• What, if any, are the benefits to be gained by decentralizing the fire 
service? 
• If the fire service was decentralized what would the chain of command 
look like? 
• How could the fire service leverage private businesses to enhance 
homeland security capabilities (metro transit, cab companies, utility 
companies, etc.)? 
a. What are the Leadership Issues Around Homeland Security? 
Leadership issues in homeland security are so vast that a number of books 
and theses could be written on the subject.  With that being said, one Delphi Member 
asserted that a very significant issue is that leaders waste too much time on discussing 
who is in charge or at fault as opposed to building true homeland security capability.  For 
many years, this was the case between the fire department and law enforcement; 
however, at least in the case of emergency response since 9/11 practice of the NIMS 
incident management system allowance for a unified command has made it easier to 
accomplish emergency tasks.  Unified command assures a representative from all 
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stakeholders a place at the command site.   In reference to leadership issues, DM-2 
responded that leaders should ensure that all stakeholders are included in strategies and 
confirmed the need to use the unified command principle in non-emergency situations.   
DM-3 stated that failure to understand the differences between leadership 
and management and education and training are barriers to homeland security.  She made 
an interesting distinction in her definition of education and training.   Education, similar 
to what is provided at NPS, is the foundation upon which understanding the new threats 
associated with terrorism must reside.  Training, on the other hand, is the actions agencies 
can take to prepare for and practice to respond to terrorist events.  Proactive verses 
reactive and strategy verses operational have been distinctions made throughout this 
thesis by most participants as well as the author.  Education verses training are another 
variation. So are transformational verses transactional leadership.  The author and the 
Delphi Members strongly believe that both education and transformational leadership are 
key components to future homeland security needs across all disciplines.    
DM-2 pointed out that it is up to fire service leadership to create a 
response paradigm that accepts the unique role of the fire department and is proactive in 
planning and collaborating with other disciplines in the prevention of and preparation for 
potential emergency events.  His observation that fire service leaders must push their 
departments into multi-discipline activities, including assigning them to emergency 
operation centers and JTTFs to improve collaboration, was congruent with the views of 
other DMs.  His suggestion of also assigning someone to the mayor’s office is an 
interesting idea that might be an effective strategy to improve fire service inclusion in 
planning initiatives.   
DM-1 observed that the biggest issue facing leadership is that the fire 
service is being pushed towards all hazard and  all risks, which includes homeland 
security.  All hazard preparedness speaks to the need for leaders to understand the 
environment in which they are now operating.  Understanding the environment speaks to 
the need to increase education and strategic thinking.  It also relates to the industry’s 
understanding, or lack there of, of its mission and the homeland security mission.  
Another issue of concern for DM-1 was  the shift in public expectation.  As a result of 
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9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Columbine, and other recent disasters, communities realize they 
are at risk.  This realization has made them more vocal and has sparked their desire to 
form effective partnerships.  The problem here as DM-1 described it is that fire service 
managers view this opportunity as a threat to status quo.  In this case, DM-1 inferred, and 
the author further suggests, leaders should use this opportunity to leverage the 
community to improve situation awareness, response capacity, and prevention efforts. 
b. What, if any, are the Benefits to be Gained by Decentralizing the 
Fire Service, and if the Fire Service was Decentralized, What 
Would the Chain of Command Look Like? 
As mentioned earlier, these questions were vague and misleading and 
therefore did not generate the responses sought.  The question of whether the fire service 
should be decentralized was meant to generate discussions on whether centralized 
organizational structures in paid departments inhibit homeland security efforts.   It was 
meant to determine if empowerment, the sharing of ideas, and lateral collaboration across 
agencies could be improved as a result.  In some cases, DM Members’ responses were 
crafted under this assumption, and in other cases they referred to volunteer and paid 
departments.   
For instance, three members responded to the questions as it relates to a 
paid department (FDNY). In reference to boroughs, divisions, and battalions, DM-5, 
supported decentralization if it meant empowering decision makers at lower levels.  He 
also claimed decentralization would encourage the sharing of ideas in think tanks or other 
regional avenues that foster critical thinking.  His position is supported by DM-3 who 
stated benefits to decentralization would promote cross training and educational 
initiatives, resulting in a greater understanding of terrorist related issues.  She observed 
the sharing of fund allocations, equipment, and information would also improve as a 
result of decentralization.   
This observation was echoed by DM-2 who in addition to the above, also 
feels decentralization could influence political policy, broaden fire officers’ experiences, 
and make them think outside the box.  Increasing political influence may result from 
assigning fire officers to other divisions as was mentioned earlier when DM-2 suggested 
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assigning someone to the mayor’s office.  According to him, decentralization should 
involve liaisons from various agencies, but not top management, assigned to multi-
agency/jurisdictional offices meeting daily or as needed making appropriate decisions 
and briefing command regularly.   However, DM-3 explained that decentralization should 
involve a Public Safety manager at the top to connect fire and law enforcement deputies.  
Most indicated that the emergency response structure should remain the same.  
On the other hand, two members responded to the question based on both 
paid and volunteer departments.  For example, one of the members (DM-6), believes 
there would be absolutely no benefit to decentralizing the fire department.  He explained 
that with more than 30,000 fire departments and only a quarter of those being paid/career 
departments, the fire industry is already one of the most decentralized organizations in 
existence.  In the case of volunteer departments, where fire protection comes from 
independent members of the community, it certainly is decentralized.  Although the crew 
is not exactly leaderless, in many cases fire suppression depends on leaderless actions.    
Another member expressed these same feelings (DM-1).  With more than 
30,000 providers, DM-1 articulated, it is nearly impossible to have one plan, one idea, 
and one voice.  The fire services in the United Kingdom, Australia, and Israel are 
centralized, organized, and managed on a state or federal system.  DM-1 suggested 
agencies benefit tremendously from this centralization, which is similar to the 
consolidation of services in the U.S.  However, unlike in the U.S., they are represented by 
a single voice.   
This lack of a single voice is an issue that has broad and far-reaching 
implications to future homeland security efforts.  It is likely a major cause of the lack of 
inclusion of the fire service in homeland security strategic planning efforts.  It is also 
connected to the concern many participants expressed about the need for standardized 
training, progressive leadership, familiarity with national homeland security strategies 
and barriers to collaboration.  Most participants agreed that the fire department needs to 
have one single voice; the question is how to get there.   
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c. How Could the Fire Service Leverage Private Businesses to 
Enhance Homeland Security Capabilities (Metro Transit, Cab 
Companies, Utility Companies etc.)? 
Whether dealing with prevention, preparedness, or response and recovery, 
the participation of private businesses could be leveraged to enhance homeland security 
efforts.  Since 80 percent of U.S. infrastructure is privately owned, and since the ability 
of a city to recover from any disaster depends on how quickly businesses are restored, it 
is imperative to leverage this group.   As a first responder agent, the fire service must 
strategically plan to augment its capacity to reach, train, and prepare business owners and 
members of the public for large scale disasters whether they are intentional, accidental, or 
acts of nature.   
This question was meant to generate responses on ways to engage 
business owners in risk assessments, continuity of operations plans, evacuation planning, 
disaster planning, emergency response, mitigation, and recovery.  Three of the Delphi 
Members responded in this manner.  DM-1, who named the above examples, pointed out 
that there are substantial incentives to partnerships between the fire service and business 
owners.  He stipulated that partnership should also be extended to other community 
stakeholders.  DM-3 recommended that financial rewards such as reduced property taxes 
or regulatory fees be used to as incentives to encourage business owners to participate.  
She recommended the use of reciprocal training and equipment to foster commitment and 
information sharing.  One of the members (DM-5) offered the Shield Program in New 
York City as a successful example of such a program.  He considered pilot programs that 
promote understanding and development of mutual missions to be key actions needed to 
leveraging support.  
However, some responders interpreted the question as be related to 
intelligence activities.  As such, they could not endorse the idea of the fire service 
leveraging business owners or members of the public in this manner.  One of these 
participants (DM-2) explained reporting intelligence information through this conduit 
should be handled by law enforcement, not fire department.  The other member (DM-6) 
advised the fire service to tread very carefully in engaging private sector in intelligence. 
Although he agreed the fire service has a strong role in homeland security and 
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intelligence, he cautioned, “this is the responsibility of the IC and POSSIBLY law 
enforcement.”  He concluded with the reminder that the fire service gets irritated when 
law enforcement interferes in hazardous material mitigation (FDNY verses NYPD) or 
other fire related activities.  According to him, interference in this manner would have 
much graver consequences than minor irritation.  
Collaboration: Members were asked to respond to the following: 
• How could fire service leaders be developed to prepare for new demands 
to the fire service mission? 
• How could the fire service provide training designed to engage other 
disciplines? 
• What are the barriers to collaboration between first responders? 
• How could obstacles to interoperability be removed?  
• If a program were established to cross train public safety employees, what 
would that program look like?       
d. How Could Fire Service Leaders be Developed to Prepare for 
New Demands to the Fire Service Mission? 
New demands to the fire service mission will most assuredly include the 
need to collaborate and build teams of first responders, elected officials, public and 
private interest, and the IC.  Responses from other participants indicated that current fire 
service culture could hinder this achievement.  This question was meant to solicit 
suggestions on ways to prepare leaders to meet these new demands.  Key responses here 
were quite similar to those recommended in the leadership category.   
Education was at the top of the list with four of the DM group members.  
Each of these members stressed once again the need to make programs such as the one at 
NPS or other federal programs available.  One member responded that educational 
training should include homeland security and counter-terrorism along with best practices 
using Great Britain and other countries as frameworks.   
Another member suggested leaders can be developed through mandatory 
promotional requirements to liaison and practice multi-agency decision making.  DM-2, 
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who replied “education, education, and education, with a little training thrown in…” 
joined DM-4 in making the distinction between education and training.   And, although 
one member did not mention education, he emphasized the need for basic intelligence 
training.  
An interesting response to developing leaders was expressed by DM-1 
involved the relationship between the fire department and the community.  He explained 
that since 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Columbine, etc., the public has grown much more 
conscientious of their vulnerability.  This has caused community leaders to seek effective 
partnerships with public safety agents.  He declared that fire service leaders have fallen 
behind in keeping up with this demand.  He called for adept leaders to exploit and 
leverage this opportunity in a positive manner.   He also pointed out once again the issue 
of tradition and an over-reliance on the mission of firefighting as issues that need to be 
addressed.  The inference here was that these are barriers that will need to be abandoned 
in order to meet current and future demands. 
e. How Could the Fire Service Provide Training Designed to 
Engage Other Disciplines? 
As one DM expressed, the process of creating a joint training program is 
easy; include representatives from each discipline in the development of the plan and 
identify mutual goals and outcomes.  The implementation is another matter.  Engaging 
other disciplines will be extremely difficult unless full endorsements from top leaders are 
clearly articulated.  Three DM agreed that this is a leadership issue that should start at the 
top.  One claimed this should take place on the local level but others inferred that it 
should be from a higher authority.  They all agreed that first responder training such as 
ICS, NIMS, response to suicide bombers, etc. should be shared among several disciplines 
to enhance engagement and collaboration.  These multi-agency courses should have buy-
in from all parties. One suggested developing relationships, not just networks. DM-6, 
interpreted the question of training to engage other disciplines to be on the subject of 
intelligence, did not believe fire provide training designed to engage other disciplines in 
intelligence.  
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f. What are the Barriers to Collaboration Between First 
Responders? 
Participants’ responses to barriers to collaboration included tradition, 
culture, law, personality types, money, power, politics, lack of understanding, ego, 
funding, fear of losing power, culture and internal demands within disciplines. One 
member (DM-3) expounded that in addition to these, lack of education, training, and 
awareness to the value in collaboration are also barriers.  In view of the consistent 
recommendations of the use of training and strategic educational courses to meet future 
demands, this makes sense. The value of collaboration presented from a strategic 
approach to a multi-discipline environment seems like an effective way to minimize 
barriers.  Another member explains the ego creates a sense of loss of influence, territory, 
or mission.  Once again, the U.K. Contingency Act is offered as a model to collaboration. 
g. How Could Obstacles to Interoperability be Removed? 
The definition of interoperability varied.  Some members in the fire 
department used the terms interoperability and integration interchangeably.  Others 
viewed interoperability as being able to talk to inter-governmental agencies and in some 
cases neighboring jurisdictions.  However, there is no model that reflects how far beyond 
municipalities boundaries (local, county, region, state, interstate) operability should 
extend. 
One member listed three issues that limit interoperability, governance and 
architecture; cost; and the issue of decentralization.  There was no unified concept or 
prescription on how it is suppose to work.   Cost was listed as an obstacle to 
interoperability by most of the participants.  DM-1 explained that many jurisdictions 
already have millions of dollars committed to their current systems and some of this 
infrastructure is new.  It is therefore, unlikely that these agencies will discard a new 
system for interoperability.  In which case, he suggested, it would take a national 
directive and federal funds to make effective change.  The third issue is the fact that there 
are 30,000 individual fire departments.  He surmised that uniting them into agreement is 
not going to happen.   
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Governmental mandates, adequate funding, and development of 
technology are all major obstacles DM-3 saw to interoperability.  Another member (DM-
2) suggested obstacles to funding could be overcome by stressing the safety benefit to 
interoperability.  His comment suggested safety could be used to influence funding from 
officials. On the other hand, the recommendation of using joint efforts, cross training, 
both top down and bottom up, implied DM-5 response leaned toward the integration 
and/or collaboration aspect of interoperability. 
h. If a Program were Established to Cross Train Public Safety 
Employees, What would that Program Look Like? 
As pointed out by one Delphi Member, there are vast differences in how 
public safety agencies function on local, state, regional, and national level.  But if there 
was a program to train public safety employees, DM-1 said it should offer pre-event to 
post-event activities.   Each discipline should receive training in intelligence, mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery.  They each must also have a basic understanding of 
the capabilities and limitations of each phase.  
Another member (DM-1) was in agreement and elaborated further that a 
program would include the recognition and understanding of terrorist planning activities, 
trends, and strategies as well as information collection, intelligence sharing, and 
information technology awareness and updates, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 
NIMS, critical infrastructure, and more.  Although both members mentioned training, 
recommendations would that would accomplishing this level of understanding would be a 
win/win for all disciplines and most assuredly improve homeland security.  However, 
according to DM-2, these training components already exist in the form of DART.   
On the other hand, one member (DM-6) disagreed with the idea of cross 
training employees.  He recommended that members should be taught how to work with 
other disciplines by training within their own discipline.  He explained that he has 
extensive experience and knowledge with working with fully cross trained public safety 
departments where each employee has multiple certifications; he pointed out that such 
training is unsustainable.   He stated employees would not achieve deep competency in 
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any discipline - similar to a jack-of-all-trades, master of none. However, he did point out 
that education is another story.  Once again, the recommendation to provide educational 
programs similar to the NPS program was mentioned.  Both DM-6 and DM-5 concurred 
that the program offered by NPS represents an effective solution.  DM-5 suggested the 
NPS program  at the  local level would be a good mechanism to cross train multiple 
disciplines. DM-6 declared the NPS program represents the best example on a graduate 
level. 
3. Delphi Members (DM) Summary 
All members of the DM thought that there is an intelligence role for the fire 
service in homeland security.  Respondents agreed on the value of intelligence, both in 
the receiving and dispensing of information.  On the receiving end, several DMs 
expressed this information should drive administrative and operational planning and 
determine capabilities and training needs.  Furthermore, it could improve safety and 
decrease firefighter injuries and death.   
One of the roles of the fire service in the IC community should include a seat at 
the table - an active position in fusion centers and on task forces.  Information could then 
be filtered from the fire representative in the center to determine what could be valuable 
to the fire discipline.  This would address the valid concern expressed by DM-3.  She was 
concerned that the IC or even law enforcement may not understand what is pertinent to 
the fire and rescue discipline.  Some of the things this liaison in the fusion center could be 
responsible would include: collaborating with the IC, law enforcement, and other 
agencies; monitoring current trends and tactics; and analyzing information.   
Another role might be that of a collector or sensor of intelligence information.  
All DM respondents agreed that since the fire department plays a primary role in the 
community, firefighters are ideally suited to act as sensors or collectors.  As expressed by 
three DM members, the fire service could gather significant information through its 
emergency response, inspections, and public education programs.  Firefighters could 
increase situational awareness and report suspicious circumstances and precursors to 
terrorist activities.        
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However, DM-6 conveyed it best when he reflected that although there is great 
value in firefighters supporting the IC, it is more important for firefighters to be 
considered homeland security leaders deserving to be served by the IC.  He recognized 
that the IC would need to make adaptive changes and adjustments to its culture to 
become willing to establish a reciprocal relationship with a non-traditional partner.  How 
this information would get shared would depend in large part on the ability to shift 
cultural differences.  All members felt information should be shared with the fire 
department in the same manner it is with law enforcement.  Some members argued that 
information should be sectioned and shared in a tiered format based on adequate 
clearances.  However, as two DMs pointed out, there is no legal basis to determine 
clearance levels or to prevent IC or LA from sharing information with the fire discipline. 
The invasion of privacy and loss of trust were concerns raised by two Delphi 
Members.  They feared these consequences would result from firefighters acting as 
sensors.  Citing HIPPA and SARA Title 3 other DMs asserted the fire service is 
accustomed to maintaining patient privacy.  Additionally, they explained that in certain 
cases the fire service is already bound by law to report confidential information.  At any 
rate, they all recognized the need for the establishment and adherence to policies and 
statutes to protect privacy rights.     
Leadership issues around homeland security included the needs to: understand 
and be included in national strategies, adopt an adaptive mission to include all hazard and 
homeland security, for effective community preparedness, and to be proactive and 
inclusive in strategic planning and collaboration among and between disciplines.  Other 
topics were explored to see if they hindered or enhanced homeland security on an 
organizational level or leadership level. 
For instance, some members indicated a belief that the centralized nature of paid 
fire departments could inhibit new ideas, leadership development and collaboration.  
They pointed out  benefits to decentralization would include empowering firefighters 
from the bottom up, encouraging participation in the decision making process, 
encouraging cross training and communication, promoting career development, and 
welcoming new ideas.  Another leadership issue involved partnering with business 
 71
owners; this is a good strategy since they own 80 percent of the infrastructure.  One 
member expressed that transformational leaders recognize and leverage communities and 
private business owners to enhance prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery 
efforts.   Assistance with evacuation, emergency, and continuity of operation plans is an 
effective way of engaging and gaining support of business owners.  Another member 
suggested tax and other financial incentives to private owners to encourage collaborative 
partnerships. As one member declared, fire service leaders must create a response 
paradigm that acknowledges the need to shift from reactive to proactive and from 
transactional to transformational leadership.   
Training and education were offered as a means to create a response paradigm 
and bridge gaps between homeland security agents.  Members acknowledged joint and 
cross training that identifies mutual goals and outcomes would enhance collaboration.   
From pre-event to post-event, the inference from most DMs was basic knowledge of each 
agent’s responsibility would enhance leadership, collaboration, and subsequently 
homeland security.  If such a program did exist, DMs were convinced that each discipline 
should be trained in intelligence, mitigation, response, recovery, preparedness, NIMS, 
WMD, critical infrastructure, terrorist awareness, trends, and strategies and more.  
On the other hand, DM-6 has had extensive experience and knowledge with 
working with fully cross trained agents and he maintained that such training was 
unsustainable and ineffective.  He reflected that NPS type educational programs offered 
on the local level would be a successful mechanism to achieve the same objective.  The 
training subjects recommended above are included in the NPS program.  However, this 
does not clearly indicate a contradiction to those views of the other Delphi Members  
listed above.  
Citing programs like the NPS one, DM group members either directly or 
indirectly assigned great value to the need for education to promote strategic thinking, 
and for training to enhance collaboration and capabilities.  All DMs associated these 
issues with leadership.  Their responses reflected that they strongly believe both 
education and transformational leadership are key components to the future role of the 
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fire service in homeland security.  Delphi Members also unanimously agreed that 
collaboration is essential to homeland security and leadership is essential to collaboration.   
The ability and need to form collaborative partnerships with all stakeholders was 
vehemently repeated among each group of participants, but more particularly with the 
DM and Cohorts groups.  They indicated ego, culture, tradition, lack of understanding 
national strategies, lack of training, lack of advanced education, and lack of endorsement 
and/or involvement from the top as some of the barriers to collaboration.  Members in 
these two groups suggested the need for transformational leadership and education to 
develop strategies to remove barriers to collaboration.  The message here clearly spells 
out the solution lies with collaboration.  It has to come from the strong leadership of the 
authorizing authority.    
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IV. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. EMERGING ISSUES AND EXPANDING ROLES 
Emerging issues and areas of responsibility to meet new asymmetrical threats 
require a response paradigm. This response paradigm in the fire department should 
include the ability to adjust service delivery to meet all hazard and homeland security 
demands.   These adaptive changes ought to be ever-evolving.  As one Delphi Member 
claimed, mission statements should have expiration dates.  Perhaps not quite as severe as 
a shelf life, mission statements should be adjusted and defined to ensure strategies and 
goals are adopted based on current and future all risk and prevention needs. Therefore, 
the future role of the fire service in homeland security will demand the need for 
progressive leadership, effective collaboration, intelligence engagement, and a shifting 
mission that supports preparedness, prevention, response, and recovery of terrorist 
attacks.   
1. Collaboration 
Barriers to collaboration will inhibit future abilities to prevent, prepare, and 
respond to all hazards or acts of terrorism.  No single public safety entity will have the 
resources necessary to meet challenges of this magnitude.  Connecting law enforcement, 
emergency medical, fire departments, public works, community leaders, and the 
intelligence community – just to name a few – is vital.   Although joint training efforts, 
policies, and memorandums of understanding have proven to be effective tools in some 
municipalities, in the case of homeland security the lack of collaboration is much too 
vital to be left entirely to local leaders.   Improving collaboration among all homeland 
security stakeholders will require a concerted and assertive effort from authorizing 
authorities and leadership on all levels.  In addition to endorsement from elected an 
appointed officials, cross training, and assigning members to other disciplines will 
improve collaborative efforts. 
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2. Education/Training 
As one Delphi Member expressed, education, education, education.  Education is 
the key to changing perspective and perspective changes worldview.  Delphi and Cohorts 
group members readily identified needs and recommended strategic change, particularly 
as it relates to leadership, leadership development, and collaboration.  On the other hand, 
the FC group offered solutions to address operational challenges and more importantly 
failed to associate barriers to collaboration as a leadership issue.   The lack of 
transformational leadership is and will continue to present a major challenge to pre and 
post homeland security events.   
Consequently, educational programs, such as is offered by NPS, designed to 
increase strategic thinking and unite teams and representatives from military, medical, 
public health, intelligence, public safety, and private industries are effective avenues to 
promoting a response paradigm.  Therefore, encouraging firefighters, from top to bottom 
to seek educational opportunities is likely to reduce resistance to changes in 
tradition/culture and promote transformation.   
Similarly, standardized and cross training among and between first responders, 
will improve response and prevention capabilities and the sharing of funds, equipment, 
and information.  Furthermore, providing standardized training, promoting critical 
thinking, and creating a dialogue of continuous communication will improve leadership 
and collaboration. 
3. Exclusion 
The profoundly obvious lack of reference to the fire service in national strategy 
documents is and will continue to have adverse effects on homeland security efforts.   
Fire service leaders view this as a major issue.  Exclusion from the NSHS affects mission 
clarity and contributes to lack of understanding U.S. missions and goals.  It minimizes the 
role of the fire service, creates disharmony, hampers partnerships, and reduces terrorism 
prevention efforts.  This exclusion is exacerbated by the patchwork leadership and 
organization make up of the fire service. 
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4. Leadership 
Current fire service leadership is hindering homeland security. The lack of a 
single voice; strict chain of command, top-down transactional management styles, and a 
culture of reactive operational posture are also barriers to future homeland security efforts 
in the fire service.  These systemic and organizational challenges should be modified to 
facilitate change, ensure inclusion in strategic planning, and improve service delivery.  
As expressed by FC-4, one of the most critical changes the fire service needs to make is 
one of mindset. The view of invincibility, brute force, independence, and rapid response 
must change.    This change in mindset must be orchestrated by the progressive 
leadership of chief officers and should include both formal and informal leadership along 
with a proactive aggressive stance from top jurisdictional leadership.  
These leaders will first need to recognize and convince their members of the vital 
need to adjust to the adaptive changes inherent in all hazard and homeland security 
prevention and response efforts.  Second, they must identify and preserve those cultural 
or traditional characteristics that are positive forces in meeting today’s demands.  Third, 
they must be willing to modify organizational culture and traditions that prevent 
homeland security.  Fourth, they must establish policies, practices, and guidelines, 
transformational in nature, to develop, educate, and empower members of all ranks.  
Finally, they must continue to monitor and educate themselves and the organization on 
national strategies, leadership, collaborative partnerships, and ways to engage members 
in multi-discipline activities, fusion centers, and planning efforts.  
5. Intelligence 
The fire service should absolutely be engaged in the receiving and delivery of 
intelligence information in order to support the pillars of homeland security strategies and 
meet current and future capability needs.  The organization is in a unique position to 
assist the IC through increased situation awareness and the detection of precursors to 
terrorist activities while performing ordinary duties.  Thus, firefighters trained by and 
accepted in the IC could easily become the eyes and ears needed to enhance 
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counterterrorism efforts.  However, strict adherence to privacy laws as well as close 
monitoring of internal policies and procedures will be essential to ensure compliance. 
Likewise, to increase safety the fire department must also have its intelligence 
needs met.  Receiving valuable information in a timely manner could mean the difference 
between life and death for first responders.  Sharing valuable intelligence information 
will minimize loss of life and injuries, improve response and recovery capabilities,  and 
help to establish effective budgetary and strategic planning.  Therefore, fire service 
leaders should demand and get their jurisdictional leaders to demand inclusion in 
homeland security planning, local, state, and regional fusion centers, and in intelligence 
requirements. However, expanding the role of the fire service to include the collection 
and detection of potential terrorist activities is just one of many ways to support national 
homeland security strategies and should not be viewed as the panacea to future homeland 
security fire service delivery.   
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
• Develop a strategy to unite IAFC, IAFF, National Fire Academy, 
IABPFF, and other fire organizations/associations to form a single 
voice.   The fire service’s contribution to homeland security is being 
impeded by exclusion and disharmony.  Complex issues demand clarity 
and congruency.   The patchwork of 30,000 fire services in the U.S., while 
qualified, need to be seamless in homeland security efforts. These 
stakeholders must establish a Homeland Security Oversight Committee 
(HSOC) team representative of all groups to ensure the fire service is 
represented in homeland security planning. 
• Lobby local, state, and federal legislatures to establish laws 
mandating collaboration and inclusion in homeland security 
strategies.   Have HSOC identify and make recommendations for revision 
of national strategies to reflect the adaptive role of the fire service.  Push 
to make collaboration and inclusion legislative mandates.  The United 
Kingdom Civil Contingency Act, created to apply the force of law to 
collaboration and information sharing, is a good example for U.S. 
legislatures to use as a model.  
• Adopt a mission addressing all hazards and adaptive changes.  
Potentials for pandemics and catastrophic disasters are forcing the fire 
service to take an all hazard approach to preparedness, prevention, 
response, and recovery planning.  This is an effective strategy.  However, 
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next generation terrorism and increasing threats demand the inclusion of 
an adaptive approach as well.  An all hazards and adaptive mission will 
allow for the use of imagination associated with the out of the box 
evolving and planning needed to meet future challenges, i.e., detection of 
precursors to terrorism. 
• Promote and reward strategic thinking through the use of planning 
and education.  Lobby federal authorities to extend programs such as the 
one at NPS to local and state levels.  Make leadership, collaboration, and 
education grant criteria and incentives.   Add education as a goal in 
strategic plans.  Encourage all members to take advantage of current 
federal, national, and state homeland security educational opportunities. 
• Provide national standardized and multi-discipline training mandates.  
Lobby legislatures to fund and mandate uniformed training to meet 
nationally recognized standards.  Lobby IC and first responder leaders to 
establish cross agency training.   
• Create open dialogue among agency leaders.  Lobby mayors, 
commissioners, and city/county managers to adopt/mandate/endorse 
collaboration as a key strategy.  Invite all stakeholders to participate in a 
process to develop strategies to facilitate collaboration, identify barriers, 
and resolve conflicts.  
• Transformation of fire service leaders.   Lobby ICMA, IAFC, IAFF, the 
National Fire Academy, and other fire service organizations to develop a 
strategy designed to influence and coach leaders to support and gain an 
understanding of the national strategies, mission shifts, strategic thinking, 
transformational leadership, etc. 
• Inclusion in intelligence.  Lobby legislators to create policy directing the 
IC to establish process to include the fire service in the intelligence cycle.  
Convene a meeting with members of IC and other stakeholders to 
determine the fire service role as a vital customer and as a vital partner in 
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APPENDIX A FC INTERVIEWS 
 
FC INTERVIEW QUOTES 1ST ORDER 
CODES 
2ND ORDER CODES 
   
“The fire and emergency 
services sector should be 
(through the U. S. Fire 
Administration) should play 
an active role the development 
of these efforts since we are 
the first responders to both.”  








In NSHS, the Fire Service is only mentioned 
once but is expected to be first to respond to 
nine of the fifteen National Planning 
Scenarios. Many fire service leaders feel this 
exclusion influence the lack of inclusion in 
intelligence and information sharing on a 
local, state and regional level. 
“The original mission in its 
simplest term says it all.  But 
for the benefit of stakeholders 
we need to explain our 
mission so that they will 
understand what it is that we 
do.  All hazard mitigation.” 
FC - A 
 




All Hazards describes the focus of 
preparedness and prevention strategies in 
response to any major disaster whether; 
accidental, man made caused by terrorists 
acts, or tornados and hurricanes caused by 
natural disasters.  
 
“There needs to be a shift in 
the more traditional focus of 
fire and emergency services 
leadership to embrace the "all 
risk" nature of our industry, 
for not only the betterment of 
service to the public but for 
long term viability of the 
industry itself.  Fire 
suppression is not a growth 





“The rise of Fusion Centers 
across the nation clearly 
addresses the aspect of 
Intelligence and Warning. 
Cities and counties with fire 
agencies not yet involved must 





Expand Role  through Prevention 
& Detection  
 
Fire service should support all of the pillars 
homeland security including: Prevention, 




on this responsibility. It is our 
duty to do so.” FC - D 
 
“Every act of terrorism we 
prevent, we also prevent our 
firefighters from being injured 




Expand Role  through Prevention 
& Detection  
 
“I don’t think we have a 
choice, since we are located 
throughout municipalities.  We 
don’t need to get 
extraordinary on information 
or detection.  One of the 
things about the fire service is 
we are used to filling in the 
gaps.”   
FC - C 
 
Information or 
detection – Fire 
Service fills in 
gaps 
Expand Role  through Prevention 




FC INTERVIEW QUOTES 1ST ORDER 
CODES 
2ND ORDER CODES 
“Border and Transportation 
Security must also be 
addressed. Those fire 
departments bordering 
Mexico and Canada must 
educate, train and grant 
authority to act on 
suspicious actions 
encountered within their 
districts.” FC - D 
 
Educate and grant 
authority fire 
departments act on 
suspicious actions  
Prevention and Detection 
“Anytime something goes 
wrong so that we have to 
respond, we should be 
collecting as much 





Prevention and Detection 
“Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure can easily be 
On responses and 
routine business, 
Prevention and Detections 
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achieved through 
educational awareness. Fire 
department personnel are 
constantly out in their 
districts on responses and 
routine business. 
Establishing training 
programs which identify 
potential terrorist target 
areas and anomalies to look 
for during the course of ones 
duties would greatly enhance 






“…the only time detection and 
collection will impact the 
public trust as long as 
detection/collection is not our 
main goal.  We are not 
primarily detectives, but 
firefighters who should be 
collecting information 
anyway.” 
FC - B 
Detection/Collection 
impact on Public 
Trust  
Prevention and Detection 
“We must expose our folks to 
the greatest minds in the 
area of all risk all hazard 
response. We must put them 
in forums that discuss 
perspectives in homeland 
security from a national and 
international perspective”.  





homeland security  
Leadership 
The ability, or lack there of, to develop long 
range goals and policies designed to plug 
current and future gaps in service delivery as 
well as address concerns around funding, 
threats, hazards, interoperability, response, 
equipment, pandemics and ways to sustain 
appropriate staffing.   








FC INTERVIEW QUOTES 1ST ORDER 
CODES 
2ND ORDER CODES 
   
 “Development of a Homeland 
Security Oversight Committee 
chaired by key department 
members which could evaluate 
these key areas of concern.  
Provide Leadership Training 
to management personnel.” 








“The greatest barrier in my 
opinion is the culture of the 
industry itself to focus 
exorbitant amounts of effort 
on certain aspects of our 
business as well as a lack of 
acceptance of our individual 
limitations.  As we understand 
our limitations, we embrace 
opportunities to collaborate, 
integrate and interoperate.”  
FC -  B 
 
Cultural 




In reference to homeland security - agencies, 
organizations, and individuals from many 
tiers of public and private sectors, working, 
training, and exercising together for the 
common purpose of preventing terrorist 
threats to people and property.   
 
 “Territorialism have a major 
impact on emergency 
management” FC - A 
Territorialism Collaboration- Barrier 
 “Relationship Barriers do not 
exist on the leadership level, 
but among fire department 




“The most critical change the 
fire service needs to make in 
order to develop a long term 
strategic plan to enhance and 
support these critical missions 
is one of mindset. 911 brought 
our nation into a new era.” 




"It is the responsibility of ever 
fire department across the 
nation to address, become 
involved and provide 
HLS protection Role/Mission/All Hazard 
 83
Homeland Security protection 
to their citizens.” FC - D 
“If we are going to embrace 
our position in homeland 
security we must shift – look 
at the departments as 
Homeland Security 
Departments that just happens 








   
 
FC INTERVIEW QUOTES 1ST ORDER 
CODES 
2ND ORDER CODES 
   
“The fire and emergency 
services sector should be 
(through the U. S. Fire 
Administration) should play 
an active role the development 
of these efforts since we are 
the first responders to both.”  








In NSHS, the Fire Service is only mentioned 
once but is expected to be first to respond to 
nine of the fifteen National Planning 
Scenarios. Many fire service leaders feel this 
exclusion influence the lack of inclusion in 
intelligence and information sharing on a 
local, state and regional level. 
“The original mission in its 
simplest term says it all.  But 
for the benefit of stakeholders 
we need to explain our 
mission so that they will 
understand what it is that we 
do.  All hazard mitigation.” 
FC - A 
 




All Hazards describes the focus of 
preparedness and prevention strategies on 
response to any major disaster whether; 
accidental, man made caused by terrorists 
acts, or tornados and hurricanes caused by 
natural disasters.  
 
“There needs to be a shift in 
the more traditional focus of 
fire and emergency services 
leadership to embrace the "all 
risk" nature of our industry, 
for not only the betterment of 
service to the public but for 
long term viability of the 
industry itself.  Fire 
suppression is not a growth 







“The rise of Fusion Centers 
across the nation clearly 
addresses the aspect of 
Intelligence and Warning. 
Cities and counties with fire 
agencies not yet involved must 
step up to the plate and take 
on this responsibility. It is our 






Expand Role  through Prevention 
& Detection  
 
Fire service should support all of the pillars 
homeland security including: Prevention, 
Detection, Intelligence and Information 
Sharing 
 
“Every act of terrorism we 
prevent, we also prevent our 
firefighters from being injured 




Expand Role  through Prevention & 
Detection 
“I don’t think we have a 
choice, since we are located 
throughout municipalities.  We 
don’t need to get 
extraordinary on information 
or detection.  One of the 
things about the fire service is 
we are used to filling in the 
gaps”   
FC - C 
 
Information or 
detection – Fire 
Service fills in 
gaps 




FC INTERVIEW QUOTES 1ST ORDER 
CODES 
2ND ORDER CODES 
   
“Border and 
Transportation Security 
must also be addressed. 
Those fire departments 
bordering Mexico and 
Canada must educate, train 
and grant authority to act 
on suspicious actions 
encountered within their 
districts." FC - D 
 
Educate and grant 
authority fire 
departments act on 
suspicious actions  
Prevention & Detection 
“Anytime something goes 
wrong so that we have to 
Collecting 
information 
Prevention & Detection 
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respond, we should be 
collecting as much 
information as possible.” 
FC - B 
 
“Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure can easily be 
achieved through 
educational awareness. 
Fire department personnel 
are constantly out in their 
districts on responses and 
routine business. 
Establishing training 
programs which identify 
potential terrorist target 
areas and anomalies to look 
for during the course of 
ones duties would greatly 
enhance local security.” FC 
- D 
 





Prevention & Detections 
“…the only time detection 
and collection will impact 
the public trust as long as 
detection/collection is not 
our main goal.  We are not 
primarily detectives, but 
firefighters who should be 
collecting information 
anyway.” FC - B 
Detection/Collection 
impact on Public 
Trust  
Prevention & Detection 
“We must expose our folks 
to the greatest minds in the 
area of all risk all hazard 
response. We must put them 
in forums that discuss 
perspectives in homeland 
security from a national and 
international perspective.”   
FC -C 
 
Exposures to forums 
and perspectives in 
homeland security  
Leadership 
 
The ability, or lack there of, to 
develop long range goals and 
policies designed to plug current 
and future gaps in service delivery 
as well as address concerns around 
funding, threats, hazards, 
interoperability, response, 
equipment, pandemics and ways to 





FC INTERVIEW QUOTES 1ST ORDER 
CODES 
2ND ORDER CODES 
   
“Development of a Homeland 
Security Oversight Committee 
chaired by key department 
members which could evaluate 
these key areas of concern.  
Provide Leadership Training 











 “The greatest barrier in my 
opinion is the culture of the 
industry itself to focus 
exorbitant amounts of effort 
on certain aspects of our 
business as well as a lack of 
acceptance of our individual 
limitations.  As we understand 
our limitations, we embrace 
opportunities to collaborate, 
integrate and interoperate.”  
FC – B 
 
Cultural 




In reference to homeland security are 
agencies, organizations, and 
individuals from many tiers of public 
and private sectors, working, training, 
and exercising together for the 
common purpose of preventing 
terrorist threats to people and 
property.   
“Territorialism have a major 
impact on emergency 
management.” FC –A 
Territorialism Collaboration- Barrier 
 “Relationship Barriers do not 
exist on the leadership level, 
but among fire department 




“The most critical change the 
fire service needs to make in 
order to develop a long term 
strategic plan to enhance and 
support these critical missions 
is one of mindset. 911 brought 






"It is the responsibility of ever 
fire department across the 
nation to address, become 
HLS protection Role/Mission/All Hazard 
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involved and provide 
Homeland Security protection 
to their citizens.”  
FC -D 
“If we are going to embrace 
our position in homeland 
security we must shift – look 
at the departments as 
Homeland Security 
Departments that just happens 
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2ND ORDER CODES 
   
DM – 1 “Lobby national 
leadership to specifically 
include fire service in public 
policy, documents, and 
strategies.  The lack of 
reference to the fire service in 
the public policies, strategies, 
or documents needs to be 
changed.”  
 





In NSHS, the Fire Service is 
only mentioned once but is 
expected to be first to respond 
to nine of the fifteen National 
Planning Scenarios. Many fire 
service leaders feel this 
exclusion influence the lack of 
inclusion in intelligence and 
information sharing on a local, 
state and regional level. 
DM – 1 “At the federal level, 
the fire service must find a 
way to coalesce in a common 
vision of what role the fire 
service should take in 
homeland security. This has 
not been done yet. Even as we 
approach the seven year 
anniversary of 9/11, no one 








All Hazards describes the focus of 
preparedness and prevention 
strategies on response to any major 
disaster whether; accidental, man 
made caused by terrorists acts, or 
tornados and hurricanes caused by 
natural disasters. 
DM - 1“If the fire service is 
going to maximize its 
efficiency and effectiveness, 
provide the greatest degree of 
safety for its personnel, it 
must embrace the advantages 
of participating in tactical, 
operational, and strategic 
information and intelligence 







Expanded Role through Prevention 
& Detection  
 
Fire service should support all of the 
pillars homeland security including: 
Prevention, Detection, Intelligence 
and Information Sharing 
 
DM – 6 “The fire service 
should be fully integrated into 
Fire service in 
intelligence  
Expanded role through Prevention 
& Detection  
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the intelligence cycle.”  
 
DM - 5“By becoming more 
aware of precursor indicators 





Expanded role through Prevention 
& Detection 
DM – 2 “Also the fusion 
center and intelligence roles 
can begin to be natural 
avenues where the FS can 
contribute. The roles to be 
filled in these areas will tend 
to be middle to senior 
management positions. 
Clearances will also need to 
be another avenue that needs 
to be embraced by the FS so 
that they can take a place 





roles in middle 
to senior 
management 
Expanded role through Prevention 
& Detection 
DM - 5 “By partnering in 
meaningful initiatives that 
include the community’s 
input.  For example, co-
development of privacy 
policies-an activity like this 
fosters organizational 
transparency and builds trust 
with the community.  This is a 
very important activity in the 
information sharing age.  It 
also sets the stage for future 
projects because co-
ownership is developed.” 
 





In reference to homeland security are 
agencies, organizations, and 
individuals from many tiers of public 
and private sectors, working, training, 
and exercising together for the 
common purpose of preventing 
terrorist threats to people and 
property.   
 
DM – 4 “Private and public 
need to understand that each 
is co-dependent upon the 
other. For example, private 
industry has the playground to 
conduct exercises and first 
responders have the 







providing a realistic setting 
first responders can train and 
private business can 
determine their readiness and 
also be prepared for first 
responders should the need 
arise.” 
 
DM – 2 “There is a growing 
trend in large metropolitan 
agencies to cross train and 
cross pollinate agencies to 
better cooperate and 








DM – 3 “Foster positive and 
collaborative relationships 
locally and abroad to 
stimulate creative exchange in 
the planning and 
implementation process (i.e. 
study best practices both 








DM – 3 “The fire industry 
should continue to integrate 
into non-fire agencies over the 
long term (i.e. TEW and 
JRIC), and possibly integrate 
law enforcement personnel 








DM – 4 “Developing local 
fusion center… report to state  
to national…by having 
information pass up and down 
this chain, Intel will be shared 


















2ND ORDER CODES 
   
“The fire service largely 
wastes the public’s faith and 
desire to partner with the 
service with a few exceptions,
including Phoenix fire, who, 
regardless of their 
motivation, has established 
the close relationship with 
their community.  A strategy 
of community oriented, 
intelligence led government 
could meet both the 
traditional and emerging 
demands on the fire service.’ 
DM - 6 
Strategy  





“A philosophic shift to 
community oriented 
intelligence led government 
would demand geographic 
integration of government 
services in partnership with 
the geographic community 
of interest, contributing 
toward synchronization of 
effort.”   
DM - 6  
 







partnerships with other 
service delivery partners 
can contribute to 
partnership, i.e. a 
Police/Fire PSAP managed 
by the fire service, a 
police/fire records 
department managed by 
police, under a public safety 
command that is 
responsible for budget of 
both services.” 






“I do not believe the role of 
the fire service should be 
expanded.  Most of the fire 
service has already 
expanded their role to 
include emergency medical 
services and must be 
cautious in further 
expansion.  It is very 
difficult to maintain a deep 
competency in firefighting; 
fire prevention, emergency 
medical response, heavy 
rescue, hazardous 
materials, and the role of 
the fire service should not 
change, but adapt to 
include terrorism.”  DM - 6   
 
“Fire already has a very 
significant role in homeland 
security, we need to be able 
to continue to fill that role 
while adapting to the added 








Fire must adapt 
Adaptation is not 
expansion 
Do not expand role  
Role/Mission/All Hazard 
 “Demand intelligence 
support from the national 
intelligence community and 
local law enforcement 
through active engagement 
and specific intelligence 
requirements for the fire 
service and their 
geographic community.”  





Do not expand role 
“The FS needs to embrace 
education on many levels to 
create a workforce that will 
be capable of 
accomplishing the many 







filled in the 21st century.”  
DM - 2 
“Although law enforcement 
and the fire service work 
together regularly, even in 
the best of circumstances, 
there are cultural 
differences that limit a truly 
collaborative relationship. 
My experience is that this is 
most prevalent on the law 
enforcement side, but the 
fire service also has its own 
issues. A prime example is 
the sharing of information.”  
DM - 1 






“Although there are claims 
that information cannot be 
shared, I have never found 
a legal basis for that claim- 
not in the privacy act of 
1984, the Freedom of 
Information Act, Title 18 of 
the US Code, or Title 28 of 
the US Code. It is an issue 
of law enforcement 

















2ND ORDER CODES 
   
DM – 3 “First, the local fire 
service agencies will have to 
gain a clear understanding of 
those critical missions that 
are defined within the 






Homeland Security Strategies 
DM – 6 “Most significantly 
too much time is wasted on 
who is in charge or who is to 
blame than building true 
homeland security 








DM – 5 “Leaders do this by 
forging into the world outside 
of the fire service mindset.  By 
this, I mean engaging in NPS-
like programs where other 
points of view educate future 










“The actions required are 
simple- engage them in 
planning efforts, maintain 
open lines of communication, 
and have someone act as a 
liaison to those agencies with 
more commitment that just 
speaking with them at 
monthly, quarterly, or annual 








DM – 3 “Advise fire service 
leaders to clearly 
communicate the HLS mission 
within their agency to all 
levels of personnel.” 
 




“As with all public safety 
providers, the service must 





successfully adapt to the 
terrorism aspect of homeland 
security, must demand a seat 
at the table of homeland 
security, must demand its 
intelligence requirements are 
met, and acknowledge 
terrorism prevention as a role 
of the fire service, not just 
terrorism response.”  DM - 6    
  
 
seat at table 
“Adaptation is not expansion. 
The Fire Service adapts to 
changing threats presented by 
building design, vehicle 
design, urban/wild land 
interface, declining revenue, 
increasing population, etc.  
The answer is seldom 
expansion, but adaptation.” 






Do not expand role 
“Building effective and 
collaborative relationships at 
the local level is much more 
doable with law enforcement, 
EMS, and public health. This 
probably varies greatly by 
region, but I have found that 
EMS and public health are 
ready, willing, and able to 
form integrated 







“At the federal level, the fire 
service must find a way to 
coalesce in a common vision 
of what role the fire service 
should take in homeland 
security. This has not been 
done yet. Even as we 
approach the seven year 
anniversary of 9/11, no one 
has ever defined the vision.”  









“Chiefs in general need to Chiefs and City Leadership 
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look beyond their own 
political boundaries and begin 
working more at the macro 
level. The same is true for the 
city manager’s as they will be 
the ones who provide primary 
support to the changing 
mission of the fire service at 
the local level.”  DM - 1 
Managers must 
work on macro 
level 
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PHASE 2  







DM - 1 
“The fire service absolutely has an 
intelligence role in homeland security. 
…the value of intelligence for the fire 
service is that it should drive our planning, 
budget, training, staffing, and equipment 
acquisition.” 




Fire service should 
support all pillars of 
homeland security 
including prevention 
and  preparedness  
through detection 
and sharing of 
intelligence 
information 
DM - 1 “Although the other disciplines 
(law, intelligence, and military) have the 
primary responsibility to prevent an attack, 
when they fail, it is the fire service that has 
the primary responsibility to respond, 
manage the incident, minimize the loss of 
life, clean up the mess, and provide for the 
safety of its personnel in a very uncertain 




DM - 1 “It seems myopic to believe that we 
will be able to do all of those things well, 
including plan, equip, train, staff, and 
budget for every possible event, without 
knowing what the current threats are and 
what the future trends will be.” 
 
Need to know 
current threat and 
future trends 
Intelligence 
DM - 1 “…fire service agencies, especially 
in urban areas and others where there is a 
validated threat, need to have at least one 
person designated to monitor the current 
threat environment, do analysis on trends, 
liaison with their law enforcement agency, 
collaborate with the other fire departments 
who are doing the same, and develop a 
relationship with whoever their fusion/JIC 
Fire representative 





group might be.” 
DM - 1 “In addition to that persons 
networking responsibilities, he/she should 
work closely with the agency’s emergency 
services coordinator, training department, 
administrative personnel, and budget 
administrator to coordinate grant 
applications, insure training is done to 
support the anticipated response, etc…” 
Work with 
emergency services, 
administrative,  to 
coordinate, train and 
anticipate response 
Intelligence 
 Leadership -The 
ability, or lack there of, 
to develop long range 
goals and policies 
designed to plug current 
and future gaps in 
service delivery as well 
as address concerns 
around funding, threats, 
hazards, interoperability, 
response, equipment, 
pandemics and ways to 
sustain appropriate 
staffing.   
Collaboration – 
In reference to 
homeland security -  
agencies, organizations, 
and individuals from 
many tiers of public and 
private sectors, working, 
training, and exercising 
together for the common 
purpose of preventing 
terrorist threats to 
people and property.   
   
 
PHASE 2  






   
Intelligence Role?    
What would it look like?   
DM - 2 “There is an intelligence role for 
the FS. The FS has primary touch with the 
local community in the form of education, 
response, inspection and training. The info 
they can accumulate can be significant. 
They not only can provide Intel they need 
to be a receiver to protect their personnel.”
 




How would Collection affect privacy 
rights? 
  
DM - 2 “Information collected should be 
funneled through screeners. Good, solid 






present lawful means and the rest 
safeguarded and/or destroyed. All 
applicable laws should be adhered to by 
the FS.” 
 
How would Intelligence information be 
shared? 
  
DM - 2 “It should be shared from the top 
down. The leaders and commanders should 
have clearance as needed to the Intel/info. 
This Intel/info should form the basis of 









Intelligence Role?   
What would it look like?   
DM - 3  “The intelligence role in the fire 
service is one that shares information with 
local first responders regarding trends, 
tactics, and capabilities that are ongoing 
within the response districts of the 
firefighters.  The intelligence capability has 
to include fire service personnel in the 
process by giving them a seat at the table 
(or in the fusion center), and including 
them in the collection process.  The 
intelligence needed by firefighters is such 
that will improve response capabilities of 
the responders.” 
 
Fire service in 
fusion center. shares 
information trends 




How would Collection affect privacy 
rights? 
  
DM - 3 “I am not convinced yet that 
firefighters should be doing collection if it 
does not originate from within a collection 
center.  I do believe firefighters are in a 
unique position to collect information 
because we are invited into homes and 
businesses within communities, but risk 
losing the public trust we enjoy by 
overstepping this boundary.”   
Firefighters in 
position to collect 
but risk public trust 
- should not 
Intelligence  
DM - 3 “I do believe that fire service 
personnel have an obligation first to be 
able to recognize criminal activity when 
they are in homes or businesses and second 
Firefighters 




to report such crimes to the proper law 
authority for follow-up.”   
PHASE 2  






How would Intelligence information be 
shared? 
  
DM - 3 “Intelligence can be easily shared 
with fire departments when they are 
represented in the fusion centers.  Again, 
the easiest way to share information is to 
give Firefighters a seat at the table – they 
will glean the information that is of value 
to their operations.” 
Firefighters seat at 





DM - 3 “Technology (computers, e-mail, 
teletype, etc.) can be used as a means to 
share information with fire departments; 
however, the collectors of intelligence 
don’t necessarily understand what is 
pertinent to the fire service responders.” 
Collectors may not 
understand pertinent 
to fire service 
Intelligence 




   
What would it look like? 
 
DM - 5 “-discovering suspicious activities 
(events) 






How would Collection affect privacy 
rights? 
 
DM - 5 “(Define terrorist information) 
Should not, “information” should be 
clearly defined (terrorist information) and 
activities should be transparent-re: local 
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How would Intelligence information be 
shared? 
 
DM - 5 “-situational awareness; threat 






Intelligence Role?   
What would it look like?   
DM - 6 “The fire service should be fully 
integrated into the intelligence cycle.  
The discussion on value of firefighters as 
intelligence sensors is an intelligence 
community centric view that must change 
to adapt to both the evolving threat and 
integration of non traditional 
participants in the intelligence cycle such 
as firefighters.”   
Intelligence 
community  centric 





DM - 6 “While it is true that firefighters 
are valuable and unique sensors that can 
form a distributed network across the 
nation, they are more importantly 
homeland security leaders who must be 










DM - 6 “Fire Chiefs must actively engage 
the intelligence community and document 
their intelligence requirements to the IC 
as they build internal infrastructure to 
ensure that those in their command are 
fully aware of the threat and prepared to 
address the threat in both prevention and 
response.” 
 









How would Collection affect privacy 
rights? 
  
DM - 6 “…there is adequate legal and 
community standard precedents for the 
role of firefighters as sensors if not 
“collectors.”  Firefighters have a right 
or obligation to report suspicion of other 
crimes in progress before those crimes 
result in death or serious bodily injury.  
Domestic violence and child abuse are 
two obvious examples.  Firefighters do 
not investigate, however they do fill the 
Firefighters have 
obligation to report 







preventative role of reporting crimes 
such as these that shock the conscious of 
the community.”  
DM-6 “Attorney/client and 
Doctor/patient relationships, while some 
of the most protected and cherished forms 
of confidentiality have reasonable limits.  
Neither Doctors nor may Lawyers stand 
by passively when they reasonably 










DM - 6 Intelligence information may be 
shared with the fire department “The 
same way it is shared with the police 
department.  Unclassified to all members 
and classified information to properly 
cleared and vetted command.  The 
arbitrary distinction of what is provided 
to a police chief and what is provided to a 
fire chief may be more an artifact of the 
joint criminal investigation and 
intelligence roles of the FBI than of need 
and effectiveness.”   
Unclassified 
information to all 
members/classified 
to vetted and 
cleared command--
---this conflicts 




DM - 6 “Fire and law enforcement have 
different roles within homeland security, 
however intelligence must begin to serve 
a greater community than just police.  If 
there was a requirement to be a sworn 
law enforcement officer before obtaining 
classified information then no policy 
maker or federal homeland security 
leader outside of LE would be privy to 







Leadership    
What are leadership issues in homeland 
security? 
  
DM - 6 “Most significantly too much time 
is wasted on who is in charge or who is to 
blame than building true homeland 
security capability.  There are so many 
issues; this question could be the basis of 
many thesis, books or discussions.  We 
Who is in charge 






might as well ask what the leadership 
issues around government are.” 
 
DM - 5 “Assurance of recognition of 
stakeholders and their inclusion in 
strategies without compromising core 








DM - 4 no response   
DM - 3 “A huge issue in my opinion is 
the lack of fire service leadership in 
terms of understanding the difference 
between training and education.  
Education is the foundation that leaders 
need to understand the new threats 
associated with terrorism (such as the 








DM - 3 “Training is the exercises 
agencies can do to practice to respond to 
terrorist events (WMD, TOP OFF, etc.).  
Lack of understanding of the difference 
between effective leadership and 
management are a barrier to effective 
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2ND ORDER CODES 
Leadership    
What are leadership issues in 
homeland security? 
  
DM - 2 “… first, accepting a promoting 
a role for the FS in HS. The leadership 
needs to remove the blinders and accept 
the unique role the FS has. Second, the 
Leadership should be proactive in 
planning with other disciplines for 
planned events and possible emergency 
events.” 
Accept unique 
role, be proactive 




DM - 2 “Presently, the FS likes to ride 
in, take care of the incident and then 
ride out to the protection that the “red 
garage doors” provide. A true FS 
Leader will push their department into 
Firefighters take 
care of incident 
and leave- true 





multidiscipline activities that will 
solidify their position within their 
jurisdictions. This means placing 
detailees to other agencies and multi-
agency activities. This could include 
emergency operations centers, JTTF’s 
and the mayor’s office to name a few. 
This could also include out of 




DM - 1 “I think the biggest leadership 
issue within the fire service today is 
recognizing that we are rapidly being 
pushed to be an all risk all hazards 
discipline. A part of that all risk all 
hazard environment is homeland 
security.” 
Recognize push 
to all risk 
Leadership 
All risk/HS 
DM - 1 “The antecedent to that 
evolution is that communities have 
witnessed events like 9/11, Hurricane 
Katrina, Columbine, and others and 
realized that they are at risk. That 
perceived risk manifests itself by 
communities being much more vocal 
about wanting their public safety 
agencies to be better prepared so as to 
minimize their vulnerabilities. It has also 
brought communities to a point of 
wanting to form effective partnerships 
with their public safety providers and 
have a greater say in how fire and police 
departments deliver their services.” 
Communities at 
risk vocal on 





DM - 1 “I believe that there are two 
problems with fire service leaders 
managers today. First, most do not 
understand the environment that they 
are in. Second, many of those that do 
understand the environment see 
community partnerships as 
threatening.” 








Benefits to be gained by 
decentralization? 
  
DM - 4 no response   
DM - 3 “I suppose one benefit to 






the background and experience cross 
trained personnel could bring to the 
table.  A person with both fire service 
and law enforcement backgrounds 
would probably have a greater 
understanding of terrorist –related 
issues.  Sharing of funding allocations, 
equipment pools, information, and 
training would also be benefits to 
decentralization.” 
 





PHASE 2  




2ND ORDER CODES 
Leadership   
Benefits to be gained by 
decentralization? 
  
DM - 2 “There could be grave 
consequences, but the results could be 
even greater. It would increase FS 
influence in operations and budgetary. It 
would broaden the experience of officers 
and make them think out of the box. It 
could place the FS in a position to 
influence political policy and decisions if 
they have a major role. The service 
should not be decentralized to the extent 
that the FS would lose their operational 
integrity. It should be handled through a 
multi-agency liaison office under the chief 





















DM - 1“I don’t see any benefit to further 
decentralizing the fire service. Nor do I 
see how we could possible become more 
decentralized than we already are. There 
are some 30,000 fire service providers in 
the US, each with their own unique 
problems, community, and political 
environment. With that many agencies it 
is nearly impossible to universally 
support one plan, one idea, one direction, 
or have one voice. Even through 
organizations like the US Fire 








and IAFC no one 






Administration and the International 
Association of Fire Chiefs, there is no one 
universal voice for the fire service.”  
 
PHASE 2  




2ND ORDER CODES 
Leadership   
Benefits to be gained by 
decentralization? 
  
DM - 1 “I have studied the fire service in 
the UK, Australia, and Israel and found 
that they function well. Part of the reason 
is that they are much smaller systems 
than the US, but part of the reason is that 
they are organized in either a state or 
federally organized system. That 
centralization helps tremendously and is 
not dissimilar to the benefits that US 









DM - 1 “Ironically, the US fire service 
has the greatest resources of any fire 
service provider in the world but our 
decentralized organization makes it 
nearly impossible to universally move in 
any single direction.”  
 





If fire service was decentralized what 
would it look like? 
  
DM - 1 “I think it would just like it does 
now- a hodgepodge of fire chiefs who are 
forced to focus only on their own 
environment rather than having the 
freedom to spend at least a portion of 
their time working at the macro level for 
the good of the discipline.” 
 
A hodgepodge of 




Collaboration – Lack 
DM - 2 “I do not think they would be 
decentralized to the extent of losing direct 
command over day to day operations. It 
should be in the form of reports and 
liaison meetings on a set schedule, 
possibly daily or even twice daily as the 











abreast of possible developing situations 
or Intel. The meetings or contacts need 
not be top commanders, just liaisons from 
all agencies. It may even be advantageous 
to place them into a multi-jurisdictional 
office that could meet regularly and brief 
the appropriate decision makers so that 
there is coordination and cooperation.” 
 
cooperation 
DM - 3 “There would most likely be a 
Public Safety Manager at the top of the 
organization, followed by law and fire 






DM - 4 no response   
DM - 5 “Response chains the same.  
Propagation of idea change, different, 
has to be flattened.” 
 




PHASE 2  






If fire service was decentralized what 
would it look like? 
  
DM - 6 The fire service is one of the most 
decentralized professions in existence, so 
the question is puzzling.  With only ¼ of 
our 1 million firefighters full time paid, 
how much more decentralized can we be?   
 





   
 
PHASE 2  






Leadership   
   
Leverage private businesses to enhance 
HS capabilities (Metro transit, utilities, 
taxies 
  
DM - 1 “The ability for a community to 
recover from a natural or man-made large 
scale emergency/disaster often lies in how 
quickly their business community can get 
Incentive to 
businesses to 





back up and running. Businesses also are 
experiencing increased awareness that they 
too need to keep going after a disaster if 
they are going to survive and minimize 
financial losses. So there are substantial 
incentives for fire service providers to 
partner with the business community (and 
other community stakeholders) and vice 
versa to insure each others viability.” 
DM - 2 “I think the report of activities 
through this conduit should be handled 
through LE not FS. The key to credible 
info/Intel through the FS is the private and 
personnel trust between the FS and the 
community it serves.” 
 




DM - 3 “Financial rewards could be used 
to leverage public businesses to partner in 
counter-terrorism planning/prevention.  
Lowering of taxes or regulatory fees 
required to run their business could be 
offered.  Also, sharing all other 
opportunities like training, education, 
equipment, and information with business 




lowering taxes, and 
fees and sharing to 




DM - 4 no response   
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2ND ORDER CODES 
Leadership   
Leverage private businesses to enhance 
HS capabilities (Metro transit, utilities, 
taxies) 
  
DM - 1 “For the fire service, some of the 
things that can be done are to assist 
businesses with their continuity of 
business plans, conduct risk and 
vulnerability assessments for businesses 
at risk, assist businesses with developing 
and practicing their disaster plans, and 
train business representatives in 




DM - 6 “The fire service should tread 
very carefully in engaging the private 
sector in intelligence.  This question is 
under “Leadership,” however as I 
understand it we are discussing the fire 
service, leadership, collaboration and 
intelligence.  The fire service should 
have a strong role in homeland security 
and intelligence; however neither Fire 
Chiefs nor firefighters should engage the 
private sector in intelligence 
partnership.  This is the lane of the 
intelligence community and POSSIBLY 
law enforcement.” 
 
Fire strong role in 
HS intelligence – 




Intelligence – FS yes  
Collaboration   
Develop fire service leaders prepare 
for demands on mission? 
  
DM - 6 “Every fire service leader should 
be educated and trained on the benefits 
and pitfalls in the seam between the fire 
service and intelligence community.  
Almost all law enforcement leaders are 
trained in 28 CFR and basic 
intelligence, with anyone with a greater 
role than receiving unclassified 
intelligence receiving intelligence 
training or intelligence command 
training.  Fire should have the same 
minimum training.” 
 
All should be 
educated and 






DM - 5 “Through programs like NPS 
and the guided dialogue theory between 
agencies.” 
NPS and dialogue Leadership 
Collaboration 
Education 
PHASE 2  




2ND ORDER CODES 
Collaboration   
Develop fire service leaders prepare for 
demands on mission? 
  
DM - 4 no response   
DM - 3 “Fire Service leaders could be 
significantly developed through the many 







today in homeland security and counter-
terrorism.  Best practices in the fire 
service could be gleaned to determine 
the best missions, core values, operating 
principles, and codes of ethics 
worldwide.  I used framework from fire 
services in Great Britain to develop 
theories for my thesis.  Mission 
statements should come with expiration 
dates so agencies would be more mindful 







vision   
DM - 2 “Education, education and 
education, with a little training thrown 
into the mix. It could also be achieved 
through multi-agency, mandatory details 
into liaison offices for promotional 
purposes. This would create well 









DM - 1 “This issue is not an issue 
limited to the homeland security mission 
but is becoming all encompassing. As a 
discipline, we are lagging behind in our 
ability to meet the public demand. 
Incidents like 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, 
Columbine, etc, are causing the public to 
feel less secure. That insecurity is 
manifesting itself by a desire for 
communities to form effective 
partnerships with their public safety 
agencies to insure that they receive the 
services they demand as well as a say in 
how those services are delivered. To 
many fire service managers, this is very 
unsettling. However, this should be seen 
as an opportunity, not a challenge.” 
Fire lag behind 
meeting public 
demand; public 







DM - 1 “Adept leaders will exploit that 
relationship in a positive way and 
leverage community support to support 








DM - 1 “The fire service has a 
tremendous opportunity to grow and 







hazard public safety discipline but it will 
require that we abandon some of our 
tightly held traditions and over-reliance 
on our legacy mission of firefighting.” 
must abandon 
tradition 
DM - 1 “If we want to evolve as a 
discipline, we will need to create healthy 
organizations that are responsive to the 
needs of our community’s. I believe that 
the way to accomplish healthy 
organization relies on four principles: 
perception modification through 
mentoring, communication, and 
education; succession/promotional 
planning and development; creating 
formal and informal leaders throughout 
the spectrum of the organization; and 
last, providing the staffing, training, 
tools and equipment to do the job the 
community wants us to do.” 
Must evolve as 
discipline Four 
principles to 




DM - 1 “In order to accomplish all of 
those things, we will also need a change 
in how we lead; namely moving away 
from transactional forms of leadership to 
a more transformational model. If we do 
all of those things well, we could be 









How could fire provide training to 
engage other disciplines? 
  
DM - 1 “I think this starts at the local 
level. Even in the best of agencies, there 
is a cultural barrier that exists between 
the fire department and other entities. 
The way around this is to develop 
positive relationships with other 
departments, agencies, and disciplines. 
But like so much we do (or don’t do) it 
requires a commitment from those at the 













DM - 1 “The functional aspects of 
engaging other disciplines in training 
are relatively easy. Get together with 









disciplines, invite them to participate, 
and include them in developing the 
training plan so that everyone 
participates and comes away with a 
predetermined goal or outcome that has 
value to all of the organizations 
involved.” 
 
DM - 2 “That is a tough one! This would 
need to be enforced from the higher 
authority, the mayor or executive office 
of the jurisdiction. Though there are 
multi-discipline training courses in ICS 
and other offerings a multi-agency 





executive office – 





DM - 3 “All first responder training 
should be shared and offered to various 
disciplines similar to information 
distribution.  I have taken several law 
enforcement-based courses including 
Incident Response to Terrorist 
Bombings, Response to Suicide Bombers, 
and Anti-Terrorism Intelligence 
Awareness Training. The fire service 
could also develop training courses in 
awareness to indicators of terrorism and 
offer the training to local businesses, 















PHASE 2  




2ND ORDER CODES 
Collaboration   
How could fire provide training to 
engage other disciplines? 
  
DM - 4 no response   







DM -6 “Not sure this is the role of the 
fire service as trainers in regards to 
intelligence.  The fire service should not 
  
 115
provide training designed to engage 
other disciplines in law enforcement, 
why should it provide training designed 
to engage other disciplines in 
intelligence?”  
 
What are barriers to collaboration 
between first responders 
  
DM -6 “Tradition, law, culture, 
personality types attracted to different 
disciplines, 187,000 different 
jurisdictions, money, power, politics, 
Politics, and day to day demands just 
handling issues within your own 






DM -5 “Organizational bias-just don’t 







DM -4 no response   
DM -4 “Ego’s, funding, fear of giving 
up power/knowledge traditions/culture, 
lack of education/training opportunities, 







DM -2 “Ego, ego, ego! Lose of sphere’s 
of influence and perceived lose of 
territory and missions.” 
 




How could obstacles to interoperability 
be removed? 
  
DM -1 “I think that there are three 
issues that limit interoperability. The 
first is governance and architecture. 
There is no unified concept on how 
interoperability is supposed to function. 
Although some agencies see this as 
being able to talk to their neighbor, few 
think beyond their immediate county or 
region. The technology is doable but no 
one has stood up a strategic plan that 
establishes what the architecture is 
supposed to look like at a national level. 
Furthermore, there is no concept on 
Governance, no 
unified concept, 








how it would be used from a governance 
perspective.” 
 
DM -1 “The second problem is cost. 
Many jurisdictions have several hundred 
million dollars invested in the 
infrastructure they currently have. Some 
of those systems are aged and could be 
replaced but others are new and there is 
reluctance to discard systems that were 
just installed. It would likely take a 
national directive and lots of federal 
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2ND ORDER CODES 
Collaboration   
How could obstacles to 
interoperability be removed? 
  
DM - 1 “Last is the issue of the 
decentralized nature of the fire 
service. There are some 30,000 fire 
service   entities in the US and trying 
to coalesce all of them into agreement 
is probably not going to happen 









DM - 2 “Attack it from safety and cost 
savings motivations. Make it a plus- 
plus for all participants. This could be 
from safety or monetarily.”  
 




DM - 3 “Governmental mandates, 
adequate funding, adequate 
development of technology that is 
functional to all agencies/disciplines, 
effective leadership and management 
skills development within first 
response agencies, improved 











DM - 4 no response   
 
DM - 5 “Through joint efforts, cross-
training, both top-down and bottom-up 
methods.” 
 
Joint efforts, top 










What would program cross train 
public safety look like? 
  
DM - 1 “Because there is so much 
variance in how public safety agencies 
do what they do, I don’t know that 
Too much 
variance 





there is a generic program that could 
be modeled on either a state or 
national level. From a regional 
perspective, we do some but not 
enough cross training with other 
disciplines. The limiting factor is 
always the overtime dollars needed for 
training.” 




DM - 1 “However, if a comprehensive 
cross training program were to be 
developed it seems logical that it 
should follow the spectrum of pre-
event to post-event activities, 
beginning with intelligence/mitigation, 
preparedness, response, and recovery. 
Each discipline should be involved in 
each of the processes so that there is 
and basic understanding of the 
capabilities and limitations in each 
phase.”    
  
 
Training pre and 
post event all 





DM - 2 “These training components 







   
DM - 3 “Recognition of terrorist 
planning activities, understanding of 
terrorist tactics, strategy, and trends, 
information collection, analyzing, 
distribution, sharing, etc., intelligence 
sharing, information technology 
awareness and updates, WMD 
response for emergency responders, 
NIMS training, critical infrastructure 
planning and protection, emergency 
management planning for large-scale 
incidents, emergency Operation 
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2ND ORDER CODES 
Collaboration   
What would program cross train   
 119
public safety look like? 
   
DM - 4 no response   
DM - 5 “NPS at the local level” NPS local Leadership 
Education 
DM - 6 “Employees don’t really need 
to be trained in other disciplines, how 
they can/should work with other 
disciplines in achieving their goals 
can be woven into all training.  I have 
extensive experience and knowledge 
with fully cross trained public safety, 
with each employee trained and 
certified as a police officer, firefighter 
and EMT.  Such training is 
unsustainable if you want a deep 
competency within each of those 
disciplines.  Jack of all trades, master 
of none.”   
 
Don’t need cross 





Training - not 
DM -6 “Education is a completely 
different story and NPS represents the 
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APPENDIX D  DELPHI FIRST ROUND QUESTIONS 
Phase One 
Delphi - First Round of Questions 
 
Future Role of Fire Service in Homeland Security 
 
What changes might the fire service make in order to develop a long term strategic 
plan to enhance and support critical missions defined in the National Strategy for 
Homeland Security in the next five to ten years? 
 
Emerging Issues Facing Fire Service (identify and develop strategy to emerging 
homeland security issues facing the fire service) 
1. What are the emerging issues that could be shaping future fire service homeland 
security efforts?  
2. How will Fire Services leaders build resilience and sustainability into their 
agencies for the next five to ten years (retirement, attrition, a more inexperienced 
workforce)  
Manage Leadership and Cultural Challenges to Collaboration, Integration, 
interdependence and Community Partnerships 
3. What strategy could fire service leaders develop to manage leadership and 
organizational challenges to future homeland security needs?  
4. What actions would the fire industry need to take to build long lasting integrated, 
interdependent collaborative relationships with other homeland security agencies? 
5. How can fire service leaders develop a strategy to engage and leverage 
community partnerships and support in homeland security protection and disaster 
preparedness? 
Expand Fire Service Current Role in the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(NSHS) to Adapt to Changing Threat Environment (The goals of NSHS include 
prevention, protection, response and recovery; and the aspiration to continue to 
strengthen the foundation of homeland security in order to ensure long-term success.) 
6. How might leaders in the fire service anticipate and plan for strategic changes in 
order to support all of the NSHS goals including prevention, protection, response 
and recovery and endurance. 
7. How could the role of the fire service be expanded to support future homeland 
security issues in a changing threat environment? 
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APPENDIX E DELPHI SECOND ROUND QUESTIONS 
Phase Two 
Delphi - Second Round of Questions 
 
Intelligence 
1. If there is an intelligence role for the fire service, what would it look like? 
2. If the fire service played a roll in the collection of terrorist information, how 
would this affect the privacy rights of citizens 
3. How could intelligence information be shared with the fire department 
Leadership 
4. What are the leadership issues around homeland security? 
5. What, if any, are the benefits to be gained by decentralizing the fire service?  
6. If the fire service was decentralized what would the chain of command look like? 
7. How could the fire service leverage private businesses to enhance homeland 
security capabilities? (Metro transit, cab companies, utility companies etc.) 
Collaboration  
8. How could fire service leaders be developed to prepare for new demands to the 
fire service mission 
9. How could the fire service provide training designed to engage other disciplines? 
10. What are the barriers to collaboration between first responders? 
11. How could obstacles to interoperability be removed?  
12. If a program was established to cross train public safety employees what would 
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